Antitrust Law on the Borderland of Language and Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-Language Radio Market? A Case Study of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation by Sandoval, Catherine J. K.
Antitrust Law on the Borderland of
Language and Market Definition: Is
There a Separate Spanish-Language
Radio Market?
A Case Study of the Merger of Univision
and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation
By CATHERINE J.K. SANDOVAL*
"Language is not a little, airtight, clean, finished container of some-
thing ... It's permeable, alive. It moves." -Lizette Alvarez'
Is THERE A SEPARATE SPANISH-LANGUAGE radio market? Mar-
ket definition is a critical step in antitrust analysis, often determining
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whether or not a merger is approved by the Department of Justice 2
("DOJ"). In its antitrust review and ultimate approval (with condi-
tions) of the merger between Univision Communications Corporation
and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation ("Univision/HBC merger"),
for the first time the DOJ announced its conclusion that Spanish-lan-
guage radio competed in a separate market from English-language ra-
dio. The DOJ determined that the merger parties participated in a
distinct smaller and highly concentrated market and required them to
divest certain assets as a condition of their merger. This remedy was
based on the merger parties' relative share of the revenues of stations
defined as offering Spanish-language radio in the markets in which
they operated.
The DOJ's decision, however, does not adequately account for
the extent to which English and Spanish-language radio stations com-
pete for advertisers and audiences. Indeed, the DOJ assumed that En-
glish broadcasters would not change their program formats or
languages to compete directly with Spanish broadcasters. Broadcast
trends before and after the merger demonstrate the fallacy of that
market entry assumption. The DOJ's analysis failed to account for the
market power of large English-language broadcasters. It also ignored
the lack of market power by Spanish-language broadcasters to exclude
English broadcasters from competition in Spanish formats. Addition-
ally, the DOJ's characterization of the markets as sharply divided by
language is defied by the rich variety of broadcast languages and
formats.
The DOJ's decision in this case has several implications for anti-
trust law. A crucial component of market definition is an analysis of
market power, and the ability of competitors to enter the market, as
appropriately defined. The reasoning of this case should be revisited
in future mergers to ensure that assumptions do not supplant rigor-
ous analysis of market power, including the likelihood of entry of
other competitors.
Through a case study of the Univision/HBC merger and recent
market developments, this Article questions whether Spanish and En-
glish broadcasters are insulated from each other in competition for
consumers and advertisers or as program suppliers. While this merger
received a great deal of attention from regulators and the press, it has
undergone little scholarly scrutiny of the market definition and its
2. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997) (outcome of
antitrust review hinges on the proper market definition).
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ramifications for competition and the public interest. This Article ana-
lyzes the implications of that definition for competition in the radio
industry, as well as the public's access to programming in Spanish and
other foreign languages. Through a review of the relevant literature
and suggestions for further research, this Article explores five main
themes raised by defining an antitrust market by language.
First, the conclusion that radio markets are sharply divided by
language and inelastic in terms of consumer substitution and supplier
entry assumes static markets where broadcasters air programming
only on one side of the alleged language divide, and advertisers can
only reach their target audiences through advertisements in one lan-
guage. The facts, however, reveal dynamic movement by many audi-
ence members, advertisers, and broadcasters between the two
languages and into bilingual formats straddling both. This fluidity
challenges the legal determination that Spanish and English radio sta-
tions compete in separate markets and exposes the lack of definitional
clarity by the DOJ regarding what should be included or excluded in
such markets.
Second, Spanish-language broadcasters lack the ability to exclude
potential competitors, a key indicator of market power.3 Before the
merger, broadcasters often changed the language (and with it the
content) of their radio broadcasts. Following the merger, several tradi-
tionally English-language broadcasters entered into Spanish-language
programming. One such entity, Clear Channel, is the largest radio
broadcaster in the United States, controlling almost 1200 stations-
more than ten percent of the commercial radio stations licensed by
the Federal Communications Commission 4 ("FCC"). These shifts into
Spanish-language programming challenge the DOJ's assumptions
about market participation, as well as the market definition and infer-
ence of undue market concentration.
Third, the DOJ assumed that competitors would not change for-
mats in the wake of a merger. This assumption disregards the ability of
broadcasters to change formats, particularly those that can leverage
their control of multiple stations to garner audiences, revenues, and
3. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956)
(reasoning that market power is the ability to control prices or exclude competition).
4. As of December 31, 2004, Clear Channel owned 1189 commercial radio stations in
the United States. Clear Channel, Investors FAQ, http://www.clearchannel.com/Inves-
tors/investorfaq.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Clear Channel]; FCC,
Broadcast Station Totals as of Dec. 31, 2004 (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.fcc.gov/mb/au-
dio/totals/index.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2005) (10,992 commercial AM and FM radio
stations licensed) [hereinafter FCC Radio Broadcast Totals].
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investor backing. Broadcasters with a substantial base in English for-
mats can readily bring their economies of scale acquired in the larger
"English market" into the alleged "Spanish market," creating a com-
petitive advantage for English incumbents. The ability to spread such
economies across formats and languages contradicts the assertion that
the Spanish-language and English-language markets are separate. It
also raises concerns about the distorting effects of the DOJ's current
market definition.
Fourth, where the defined market serves a group that is a numeri-
cal as well as a linguistic and ethnic minority, it is critical to recognize
the factors that impede service to that community and result in fewer
providers serving that audience. 5 Though a substantial minority,6 the
history of Hispanics as a minority shapes the market's willingness to
provide programming targeted at them. Antitrust analysis requires
consideration of the alleged market's history, structure, and industry. 7
Without an appreciation of those dynamics, antitrust regulators may
conflate market concentration in a small (and artificially defined
"market") with market power.8
5. See STEVEN S. WILDMAN & THEOMARY KARAMANIs, THE ECONOMICS OF MINORITY
PROGRAMMING; ASPEN INSTITUTE COMMUNICATIONS & SOCIETY ROUNDTABLE ON DIvERsrrY IN
THE MEDIA 3 (1997), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/site/c.huLWJeMRKpH/b.785521/
k.7429/TheEconomics ofLMinorityProgramming.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
Wildman and Karamanis posited that until the number of broadcast stations or the size of
the minority audience grows, it will be more profitable to serve the majority, delaying ser-
vice targeted to the minority if it is provided at all. Id. See also Philip M. Napoli, Audience
Valuation and Minority Media: An Analysis of the Determinants of the Value of Radio Audiences, 46
J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 169, 181 (2002) (finding that stations whose audi-
ences were more than 50% racial or ethnic minorities earned less advertising revenues
than those whose audiences were predominantly non-minority). Philip Napoli com-
mented, "Minority-targeted media content suffers from not only the potentially lower valu-
ations of minority audiences but also from the fact that, by definition, it appeals to a small
audience." Id.
6. In 2004, the thirty-nine million Hispanics in the United States, constituted 13.7%
of the United States population. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Heritage
Month 2004: Sept. 15-Oct. 15 (July 15, 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/factsforfeatures.special_editions/002696.html. The
United States Hispanic population grew by 13% since 2001, quadruple the rate for the
United States population overall. Id. In the year 2000, Spanish was the second most com-
monly spoken language in the United States, with nearly twenty-nine million speakers. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-37, ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH BY LANGUAGE SPo-
KEN AT HOME 2000 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-
t37/tab01a.pdf. (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
7. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1973) (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962)) (merger has to be viewed func-
tionally, in the context of its particular history, structure, and industry).
8. See E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 392.
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Fifth, the DOJ's market definition may create disincentives to
provide Spanish programming. As broadcasters recognize they can
grow more by providing English programming, some may change
their formats, both to attract the audiences and revenues associated
with those formats, and to escape the antitrust confines of a more
restrictive market.
These issues assume heightened importance when the product
involves speech, particularly news and public affairs. This case and its
market definition influence not only music and entertainment pro-
gramming, but also access to news and public affairs information,
which is at the heart of our democracy. The First Amendment values
of encouraging a diversity of voices from a multiplicity of sources un-
derscore the importance of defining the market correctly. 9
Radio is the primary news source in the United States in the
morning and during the day.10 African-American and Hispanic audi-
ences listen to more radio than the general population, and their use
of radio as a significant news source continues into the evening."t The
Radio and Television News Directors Foundation ("RTNDF") re-
ported that news ranked second after music as a reason why people
tune into a radio station.' 2 The study also found that across all groups
9. Neither the DOJ, nor the court approving the final judgment in this case analyzed
the appropriate constitutional standard of review for an antitrust market definition based
on language. See United States v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,242 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003), 2003 WL 23192527. This Article argues that defining the
antitrust market by language is a regulation of speech that creates disincentives for broad-
casters to provide Spanish language programming and may limit audiences's ability to hear
those messages. The Supreme Court has determined that a regulation involving speech
must first be analyzed to determine if the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). If the regulation is content-
based, then strict scrutiny and the use of the least restrictive means are required. Id. If it is
content-neutral, the substantial government interests served are examined according to
intermediate scrutiny, and the choice of a remedy must not "burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). The constitutional analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article, but these issues underscore the need to define the market consistent with
both antitrust and constitutional principles.
10. See RADIO NEWS SURVEY, THE AMERICAN RADIO NEWS AUDIENCE SURVEY, EXAMINING
THE USE, PERCEPTION AND FUTURE OF RADIO NEWS (2001), available at http://www.rtnda.
org/radio. One-third of American adults turn to radio for their news when they get up and
are getting ready for their day. More than three-quarters of commuters rely on radio for
news while traveling to and from work-and once there, one-third of workers use radio to
get most of their news. Listeners surveyed perceived radio as second to local and national
television for providing a lively exchange of opinions on issues, ranking above newspapers
for this purpose. Id.
11. Id. (follow "Radio News Listening Patterns" hyperlink).
12. Id. (follow "Radio in Today's News Media Mix" hyperlink).
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music stations are the most popular source of radio news. 13 The Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press found that the average
American spends thirty-two minutes a day watching news on television
or cable and seventeen minutes listening to news on the radio.1 4
This Article challenges the evidence and presumptions affecting
the DOJ's determination that Spanish-language radio is a separate
market for antitrust purposes. It recommends a dynamic approach to
analyzing the radio marketplace. That analysis must account for: (1)
the fluid behavior of broadcasters, advertisers, and audiences in mov-
ing between formats and languages; (2) the importance of multiple
ownership and market power in the English market to competition
across languages; (3) factors that influence programming choices, in-
cluding the dynamics of markets that serve a minority; and (4) the
incentives created by this market definition.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Univision/HBC
merger and the regulatory and industry dynamics that shaped the
transaction. Part II critiques the DOJ's market definition by language
using the United States Supreme Court's standards articulated in
Brown Shoe v. United States.1 5 In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court laid out
a seven factor test for determining the contours of an antitrust prod-
uct market: "[(1)] industry or public recognition of the submarket as
a separate economic entity, [(2)] the product's peculiar characteris-
tics and uses, [ (3) ] unique production facilities, [ (4) ] distinct custom-
ers, [(5)] distinct prices, [(6)] sensitivity to price changes, and [(7)]
specialized vendors.' 6
Part III examines the consequences for antitrust market defini-
tion and participation stemming from the DOJ's presumptions that
no broadcasters would change their formats to Spanish. Part IV ex-
plores market concentration in light of the dynamics of serving a lin-
guistic and ethnic minority.
I. Overview of the Univision/HBC Merger, Parties,
and Issues
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand the context
in which the Univision/HBC merger occurred. The Telecommunica-
13. See id.
14. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, NEWS AUDIENCES INCREASINGLY
POLITICIZED 11 (2004), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/215.pdf (last vis-
itedJuly 24, 2005).
15. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
16. Id.
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tions Act of 199617 ("Act") dramatically changed the radio landscape.
It eliminated the cap on the number of stations a single entity could
own nationally and raised the number that a single entity in a market
could control based on the size of the market.18 A wave of consolida-
tion followed the Act's passage, requiring DOJ approval for many
deals because of the size of the transactions and their potential impact
on competition.
Before the Telecommunications Act, the largest radio company
in America owned sixty-four stations. 19 By 2004, the largest radio com-
pany, Clear Channel, controlled nearly 1200.20 For smaller broadcast-
ers, the imperative to expand in order to compete is especially
intense. 21 Thus, the market definition is important to other broadcast-
ers who seek to merge in order to enhance their ability to compete.
The DOJ is required to examine potential mergers valued at over
$50 million. 22 While this may seem like a high dollar threshold, FM
radio stations may sell for $17 million in a medium-sized market, such
as Sacramento, California and $150 million in a large market,23 mak-
ing it common for media companies to be subject to antitrust review
17. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 156 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
18. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the national cap on the number
of AM or FM radio stations a single entity could control. Id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110,
amended by Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 188 Stat. 99 (1997) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (2000)). It also permitted an entity to control up to eight commercial stations in
any market with forty-five or more such stations, up to seven commercial stations in a mar-
ket with thirty to forty-four such stations, up to six commercial radio stations with between
fifteen and twenty-nine such stations, and up to five commercial radio stations in a market
with fourteen or fewer such stations. Id.
19. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 432 (3d Cir. 2004).
20. Clear Channel, supra note 4.
21. Iw PLANNING GROUP LLC, WHOSE SPECTRUM IS IT ANYWAY? HISTORICAL STUDY OF
MARKET ENTRY BARRIERS, DISCRIMINATION AND CHANGES IN BROADCAST AND WIRELESS LICENS-
ING, 1950 TO PRESENT 39-40 (2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb-
study/historical-study.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005) (submitted to Office of General
Counsel, FCC and noting that media lenders and venture capitalists prefer deals worth $10
million or more, involving several stations and markets).
22. All persons contemplating certain mergers or acquisitions valued at more than
$50 million are required to file a notice with the Federal Trade Commission (and the
Department ofJustice for certain mergers, including those in the media and telecommuni-
cations industries) before consummating the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2) (B) (i)
(2000).
23. See Kevin Brass, Turning Up the Volume, Hisp. Bus. MAG., Dec. 2004, at 50, 58, avail-
able at http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=19463 (last visitedJuly 10,
2005).
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for mergers. Univision offered Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation
$3.5 billion in consideration for the merger. 24
Prior to the merger, Univision held FCC licenses for thirty-two
full-power television stations, as well as several low-power television sta-
tions.25 Univision did not directly control any radio licenses. Hispanic
Broadcasting Corporation ("HBC") controlled sixty-eight full service
radio licenses 26 and no television stations. HBC was the nation's larg-
est Spanish-language radio group with revenues roughly twice that of
the next largest provider of Spanish-format radio, Entravision. 27 Prior
to the merger, HBC produced annual revenues of $240 million, prin-
cipally from its radio business.28 In 2002, HBC controlled 51% of
Spanish-language radio revenue in the top ten markets and had an-
nual revenues nearly twice as large as Entravision.29
At the time of the merger, Clear Channel held 26% of the equity
of HBC.30 After the merger, Clear Channel's stock was to be con-
verted into a 3.66% voting stock interest in Univision. 31 Following
Clear Channel's conversion of several of its stations to Spanish-lan-
guage and bilingual formats, the companies agreed that Univision
would buy back all of Clear Channel's stock in Univision.3 2
At the time of the merger, Univision held approximately 30% of
the equity of Entravision. 3 Entravision owned forty-nine television sta-
24. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 4, 11, United States v. Univision Commc'ns
Inc., 2003 WL 23192527 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 1:03CV00758), 2003 WL 23781621.
25. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18834-35 (2003).
26. Press Release, FCC, FCC Grants Conditioned Approval of Univision/HBC Merger,
Company Must Comply with New Radio Ownership Limit Six Months from Effective Date
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
239081Al.pdf [hereinafter FCC UVN/HBC News Release]. HBC controlled licenses for
eighteen AM, fifty FM stations, and six FM translator authorizations. Id.
27. HBC's revenues were $240 million in 2001, while Entravision's radio revenues
were $65 million. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 3, 1 9.
28. Id.
29. Joint Statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein & MichaelJ. Copps, Comm'rs, FCC, Ap-
plications for Transfer of Control of Certain Subsidiaries of HBC to Univision Communica-
tions, Inc., at 4 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/FCC-03-218A2.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Adelstein/Copps
Statement].
30. Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. at 18836, 3.
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Univision Commc'ns Inc., Univision Prices Common Stock Offer-
ing and Agrees to Repurchase Shares from Clear Channel (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/LosAngeles_07012004-0.html.
33. Competitive Impact Statement at 3, United States v. Univision Commc'ns Inc.,
2003 WL 23192527 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 1:03CV00758), available at http://www.
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tions,34 almost all of which were affiliates of Univision, displaying
Univision programming and its national commercials. 35 Entravision
also controlled licenses for fifty-two full service radio stations.3 6 Univi-
sion had a variety of special investor rights in Entravision. These in-
cluded the right to veto sales or purchases of assets over $25 million
dollars and the right to veto the sale of any Entravision television sta-
tion running Univision programming.
37
The DOJ focused on the overlap in the radio market resulting
from Univision's substantial equity interest and corporate rights in En-
travision. 38 The DOJ was concerned with the effects the merger would
have on competition between the newly merged Univision/HBC and
Entravision due to the radio assets Univision would acquire from
HBC.
In defining the relevant product market in other radio mergers,
the DOJ acknowledged that television, newspapers, and other media
compete for advertising dollars.3 9 Nevertheless, the DOJ concluded
that the advertising industry views radio as a distinct medium, well-
suited to reaching targeted demographics. 40 After defining the prod-
uct market as radio, the DOJ defined the relevant geographic market
in which the potential merger partners competed. 41
Next, the DOJ examined whether Univision, through its equity
interest and rights in Entravision, and HBC competed in the general
radio market or in a market defined by the Spanish-language or some
other criteria. The DOJ's consent decree for the HBC/Univision
merger does not reflect any analysis of whether the market could be
defined by ethnicity or race of the listeners, and no DOJ decision dis-
tinguishes markets on that basis. Instead, based on interviews with ad-
usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (last visited March 10, 2005). The parties are
referred to in this Article as "Univision" or "UVN" and "HBC."
34. Of the forty-nine FCC television authorizations Entravision held, eighteen were
for full service television stations. Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18
F.C.C.R. at 18835.
35. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 7, 1 23.
36. Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. at 18835.
37. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 4.
38. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 7-9, 22-26.
39. See, e.g., Comment and Petition for Hearing, Triathlon Broad. Co. & Capstar Ra-
dio Broad. Partners, File Nos. BTC-980821EE, BTC-980821EF, BTC-980921EG, BTCH-
980821EH, BTCH-980821EI, BTCH-980821EJ (F.C.C. Oct. 19, 1998), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/2026.htm (last visited July 5, 2005) [hereinafter
Triathlon Petition].
40. Id. at 7-8.
41. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 4-5.
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vertisers, the DOJ determined the relevant market was Spanish-
language radio.42
The DOJ's analysis of the merger is governed, in part, by the Hor-
izontal Merger Guidelines43 ("the Guidelines"). The Guidelines ex-
plain that "mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise." '44 A seller's market power is
defined in the Guidelines as "the ability profitably to maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time. '45 In radio,
the broadcaster is the "seller" of advertising time. Time and the audi-
ence reached are the media company's "products," and advertisers are
its consumers. The DOJ was concerned that the "proposed acquisition
of HBC would lessen competition substantially in the provision of
Spanish-language radio advertising time to a significant number of ad-
vertisers in several geographic areas of the United States. '46
The DOJ determined that HBC and Entravision "face few other
significant competitors" in the radio markets in which both overlap
and "are the next best substitutes for each other. '47 If their shares of
Spanish-language radio advertising revenues in those markets were
combined, the DOJ concluded the total share would range "from 70
to 95 percent. '48
In its complaint, the DOJ pled that unless restrained, the merger
would lessen competition in the sale of advertising time on Spanish-
language radio in the markets where HBC and Entravision overlap,
increasing prices and decreasing services in those markets.49 The DOJ
alleged this merger would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act,50 which pro-
hibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.51
As a condition of the merger, Univision was required to reduce its
equity investment in Entravision to 15% of outstanding shares within
42. Id. at 5.
43. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 (Sept. 10, 1992) (never
codified).
44. Id. at 41553, § 0.1.
45. Id.
46. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 2.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2000)).
51. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 10, 28.
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three years of the consent decree and to 10% within six years.52 Univi-
sion also gave up some of its corporate rights in Entravision, particu-
larly the right to veto the purchase or sale of Entravision radio assets
and its seats on Entravision's board.53 Univision's corporate controls
of Entravision were extensive, including the right to veto radio sales or
purchases, which could have prevented Entravision from exercising its
judgment about its competitive radio strategy. 54 Apart from the mar-
ket definition, these investor rights were a key determinant of the
DOJ's decision regarding the proposed remedy.
In future cases the remedy of divestiture of equity in a third party
may not be available. In such cases, this market definition may lead
the DOJ to order the sale of certain radio stations owned by the
merger parties, or to prohibit the merger in cases where no such or-
der would be made if the stations broadcast in English.
Univision and HBC agreed to the final judgment and did not
publicly protest those terms.5 5 Parties often agree to the DOJ's terms
because the deal is more valuable to them than what they are required
to divest.
The Univision/HBC merger gave the DOJ the opportunity to fur-
ther explore the issue of whether there is a separate "Spanish market"
and to announce it as precedent for future mergers. Competitors
within a language will now be faced with this presumption for their
antitrust market definition. This Article will analyze the factors rele-
vant to the validity of that presumption.
52. United States v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc, 2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,242, at
98,013 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003), 2003 WL 23192527.
53. Id.
54. The DOJ allowed Univision to retain its corporate rights to "veto any decision by
Entravision to merge, consolidate, or otherwise reorganize... that results in a transfer of
all or substantially all of the assets of Entravision or a transfer of a majority of the voting
power of Entravision." Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 11. Univision also
retained its rights to veto the sales of any television stations that are Univision affiliates. Id.
Entravision and Univision are permitted to terminate these rights, but cannot expand or
modify them. Id. Under these rights, Univision could veto the sale of Entravision to Clear
Channel, for example, which has become a major competitor to Univision in many of
Univision's radio markets. The DOJ justified allowing Univision to retain its rights to veto
the ultimate ownership of Entravision because "it cannot be used to veto or influence day-
to-day decisions relating to radio competition or strategic decisions such as the buying or
selling of individual radio stations." Response to Public Comments at 9, United States v.
Univision Commc'ns Inc., 2003 WL 23192527 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 1:03CV00758),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/201510.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2005). However, the decision to sell a company is arguably the most important corporate
decision in which a direct competitor could participate.
55. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 2.
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H. Market Definition: Cross-Elasticity of Demand, Fluidity of
Formats, and the Distinction Between Format
and Market
Section II of this Article will analyze the available evidence of
whether Spanish and English radio compete in separate markets ac-
cording to the factors the Supreme Court articulated in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States,56 to determine the contours of a market. Those factors
focus on cross-elasticity of demand: the substitutability of one product
for another.
Section A examines the Brown Shoe factor: "industry or public rec-
ognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity."57 It analyzes
the perceptions of advertisers and marketers regarding the use of En-
glish and Spanish-language media to reach Hispanic audiences, con-
cluding that advertisers may define the market by ethnicity rather
than language. In contrast, the DOJ defined the market by the pre-
dominant language of the broadcast's format, suggesting that more
research is needed to confirm the validity of the DOJ's market defini-
tion. Section B analyzes language and media usage by Hispanics in the
United States to examine potential "public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity."58
Section C considers whether broadcasters are divided into spe-
cialized vendors by language, an indicator under Brown Shoe that mar-
kets are separate. 59 While some companies broadcast only in Spanish
formats, Univision, Entravision, Spanish Broadcasting System ("SBS"),
and several other companies who target the Hispanic community also
have stations that broadcast exclusively in English. 60 The entry of
Clear Channel and other broadcasters into Spanish-language pro-
gramming indicate that broadcasters are not specialized vendors by
language, but cross between languages and program formats.
Section C also analyzes "the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses," and the distinctiveness of their customers, two other Brown Shoe
56. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
57. Id. at 325.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Entravision Commc'n. Corp., All Radio Listing, http://www.entravision.com/
template.cfm?page=media&subpage=radioAll (last visited July 10, 2005) [hereinafter En-
travision Radio Stations]; Spanish Broad. Sys., Stations by Format and Region, http://
www.spanishbroadcasting.com/stations-pr.shtml (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (offering sta-
tions playing "American" Contemporary Hit Radio and "American" 1980s and 1990s hits in
Puerto Rico).
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factors used to define a submarket. 6 1 This Section concludes that
broadcasters' increasing use of bilingual formats makes it difficult to
draw a sharp line around what constitutes Spanish programming. The
appeal of formats in different languages or variations thereof to many
of the same audience members suggests that each product's character-
istics do not make them so peculiar or distinctive that a submarket is
clearly demonstrated.
Section D analyzes the Brown Shoe factors of distinct prices and
sensitivity to prices changes as relevant to defining a submarket.6 2 It
analyzes research that finds that advertisers pay lower prices to adver-
tise on Spanish and other minority-oriented formats, than on "Gen-
eral Market" formats. However, those prices can also be correlated to
the fact that the audience is primarily composed of minority group
members. 63 Thus, lower prices do not distinguish Spanish-language as
a separate market since English formats serving minority audiences
also experience lower prices.
A. Advertiser, Marketer, and Broadcaster Perceptions Regarding
Spanish-Language Radio Substitutability
In a Clayton Act antitrust case, the government bears the burden
of proof in establishing the proper market definition. 64 Determina-
tion of the relevant market is a question of fact, and the government
has the burden of proving facts to establish a prima facie claim. 65 The
goal of merger analysis is to protect competition. 66
The first factor of the Brown Shoe test of the contours of a product
market is "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a sepa-
rate economic entity. 67 One measure of industry perception of a sub-
market is customer behavior. The DOJ has stated that the customers it
is trying to protect are those who seek to place advertisements on
Spanish-language stations.68 The DOJ focuses on the advertisers' likely
61. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
62. Id.
63. Napoli, supra note 5, at 181.
64. United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997).
65. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1981).
66. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344 (the Clayton Act protects competition, not
competitors).
67. Id. at 325.
68. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 5. The DOJ's antitrust analysis
does not directly take into account the interests of the viewers. The FCC's merger review
should take audience interests into account as part of its evaluation of whether the merger
would serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." See Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 310, 48 Stat. 1086 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000)).
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substitution between products-cross-elasticity of demand in eco-
nomic terms.69
Moreover, radio and other means of mass communication really
have two consumers: the listening audience and the advertisers.
Broadcasters use various factors including the size, buying habits, and
demographic characteristics of their listening audience to convince
advertisers to buy advertising time on their stations.70
In conducting a horizontal merger analysis, the DOJ follows the
Guidelines, which set out general standards for defining the relevant
product market. The Agency takes into account all relevant evidence
including:
(1) evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting
purchases between products in response to relative changes in
price or other competitive variables;
(2) evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of
buyer substitution between products in response to relative
changes in price or other competitive variables;
(3) the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in
their output markets; and
(4) the timing and costs of switching products.71
"The Agency generally will consider the relevant product market to be
the smallest group of products that satisfies this test. '72
As a step in determining the contours of the relevant market, the
DOJ asked advertisers if they would switch from Spanish to non-Span-
ish formats if prices were to rise in Spanish radio. 73 Some advertisers
reported to the Antitrust Division that they felt they had no effective
alternatives-that non-Spanish radio was not an effective substitute to
reach "customers who speak Spanish and who listen predominantly or
exclusively to Spanish-language radio."74 The DOJ concluded that
Spanish-language radio advertisers "would not find it economical to
69. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (the outer boundaries of a product market are deter-
mined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween the product markets for antitrust purposes).
70. See KOMl ASIEDU OFORI, CIVIL RIGHTS FORUM ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, WHEN
BEING No. 1 Is NOT ENOUGH: THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING PRACTICES ON MINORITY-OWNED
& MINORiT-FORMATrED BROADCAST STATIONS app. A at 3 (1999), available at http://www.
fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/Informal/ad-study/ (last visited July 24, 2005) (submitted
to Office of Communications Business Opportunities, FCC).
71. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41554, § 1.1 (Sept. 10,
1992) (never codified).
72. Id.
73. The DOJ reported that its "inquiry included numerous interviews of a wide range
of advertisers and review of over a million pages of documents provided by the defendants
and other entities." Response to Public Comments, supra note 54, at 6.
74. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 5.
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switch, or credibly threaten to switch, to other media to avoid a post-
merger price increase." 75 The DOJ reported that a significant number
of local and national advertisers "view Spanish-language radio, either
alone or in conjunction with other media, to be the most effective way
to reach their target audience and do not consider other media, in-
cluding non-Spanish-language radio, to be a reasonable substitute." 76
The DOJ concluded that these "advertisers would not turn to other
media, including radio that is not broadcast in Spanish, if faced with a
small but significant increase in the price of advertising time on Span-
ish-language radio or a reduction in the value of the services
provided." 77
It is very difficult to independently analyze these conclusions,
since the DOJ does not disclose the names or quantity of advertisers
surveyed. The DOJ's Complaint and Competitive Impact Statement
summarize the Department's findings but provide few details regard-
ing the evidence of the lack of substitutability between Spanish and
English-language radio for advertisers. Nor do those pleadings discuss
evidence of broadcasters' behavior in recognition or anticipation of
competition between languages. The paucity of information provided
makes it difficult to analyze the DOJ's conclusions about the evidence
for this market definition. Therefore, this Part will explore issues and
publicly available evidence relevant to this conclusion.
Advertiser responses may be shaped by the question asked and
their self-interest in wanting to preserve as many competitive outlets as
possible to avert or mitigate price increases. The survey results may
also be influenced by the current market alternatives. For example,
advertisers with experience marketing on "Spanglish" or "Tejano" sta-
tions broadcasting in a mix of English and Spanish might have a dif-
ferent view of alternatives than those who do not have such stations in
their markets.
In markets where bilingual radio has been established, some ad-
vertisers have requested that their commercials be broadcast in "Span-
glish," a mix of Spanish and English, to appeal to the bicultural
audience. 78 The New York Times reported that on radio station KXTN-
FM in San Antonio, Texas, which was rated number one in its local
market for four years, Disc Jockeys ("DJs") would say things like,
"Recuerdales que hoy, esta tarde, vamos a estar en vivo in Dillards,
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Alvarez, supra note 1, at Al.
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broadcasting live from 3 to 5, with your chance to win some cool
KXTN prizes. Acompafien a sus amigos. ' 79 This translates to: "Re-
member that today, this afternoon, we are going to go live from Dii-
lards, broadcasting live from 3 to 5. Come with your friends."80
Many advertising and marketing agencies stress the need to rec-
ognize the linguistic diversity of Hispanics in devising advertising strat-
egies. One advertising agency executive, Raquel Tomasino, Media
Director of Castells & Asociados in her letter to the FCC about the
merger cautioned against "Approaching the Market as if It Were a
Monolithic Segment."81 The United States Census for the year 2000
reported that almost twenty-nine million Americans speak Spanish at
home. 82 Of those, 51% reported speaking English "very well," while
10% reported they did not speak English "at all."83 Tomasino stressed
the importance of recognizing that while many Hispanics in the
United States are foreign-born and Spanish-dominant, a substantial
portion are bilingual or English-dominant. 84 She commented that En-
glish-dominant or bilingual Hispanics could be reached with "cultur-
ally-relevant English ads (like African-American[s]) .... Companies
like McDonald's who do this well have very strong Hispanic
positions. "85
Marketing consultants Kevin Clancy and Peter Krieg emphasized
that the United States Hispanic market "is actually divided into
thirds-one-third speaks primarily Spanish, another third only or pri-
marily English, and the other third is bilingual .... ,,86 Clancy and
Krieg stressed "media usage isn't an either/or choice; some Hispanics
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Letter of Raquel Tomasino, Executive Vice President, Dir. of Media Servs., Castells
& Asociados Adver. (May 22, 2003) [hereinafter Tomasino Letter], attached to Letter from
Philip L. Verveer, Sue D. Blumenfeld, Michael G. Jones & David M. Don, Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (June 2, 2003) [herinafter Willkie Farr
Letter], attached to Letter from Claudia R. Higgins, Kaye Scholer LLP to James R. Wade,
Chief, Litig. III Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201500/201510b.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
82. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 6.
83. Id.
84. Tomasino Letter, supra note 81.
85. Id.
86. Press Release, Kevin J. Clancy & Peter C. Krieg, Copernicus Mktg. Consulting, A
Counterintuitive Discovery About Media Buying for the U.S. Hispanic Market: The Bipolar
Approach Wastes Marketing Dollars (Feb. 4, 2002), http://www.copemicusmarketing.
com/about/docs/hispanic-media optimization.htm (last visited July 11, 2005).
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use English-language, some use Spanish-language, and others (a.k.a.
the bilingual segment) use both."87
However, advertisers targeting bilingual consumers may be drawn
to Spanish-language broadcasting, at least on television, because of re-
search indicating that Latinos find that commercials in Spanish are
more persuasive, and retain their message better than commercials in
English. Roslow Research Group conducted studies in 1994 and 2000
of the effectiveness of advertising in the Spanish versus English lan-
guages on television for Latinos between the ages of eighteen and
forty-nine.88 The studies found that "advertising to Hispanics in Span-
ish is significantly more effective than advertising to Hispanics in
English."89
In 2000, Roslow conducted a study of advertising effectiveness on
television for Hispanic teenagers between the ages of twelve and sev-
enteen, many of whom are bilingual. 90 Roslow found Spanish-lan-
guage advertising was also more effective for Hispanic teenagers,
though not by the same margin as for Hispanic adults. For Hispanic
teens, Spanish-language advertisements were twice as persuasive as En-
glish-language advertisements.9 This compared to 4 and 1/2 times as
persuasive for adult Hispanics. 92 Recall of Spanish-language advertise-
ments was approximately 16% greater for Hispanic teenagers, while it
was 57% greater for Hispanic adults. 93
The Roslow studies did not examine whether advertising effec-
tiveness was influenced by its placement with Spanish-language pro-
gramming. Spanish-language advertisements are occasionally
broadcast during English programs, allowing advertisers to reach
Spanish-speakers in Spanish, even during English programs. 94 Con-
versely, English-language advertisements are occasionally aired during
87. Id.
88. ROSLOW RESEARCH GROUP, SPANISH VS. ENGLISH ADVERTISING EFFECTIVENESS AMONG
HISPANICS 10 (2000), available at http://www.roslowresearch.com/studies/33.doc (last vis-
ited July 10, 2005) [hereinafter RoSLOW, HISPANIC ADULTS].
89. Id. at 3.
90. RoSLow RESEARCH GROUP, SPANISH VS. ENGLISH ADVERTISING EFFECTIVENESS AMONG
HISPANIC TEENS 2, 9 (2000), available at http://www.roslowresearch.com/studies/91.doc
(last visited July 10, 2005) [hereinafter RoSLOW, HISPANIC TEENS].
91. Id. at 3.
92. RoSLOW, HISPANIC ADULTS, supra note 88, at 3.
93. RosLow, HISPANIC TEENS, supra note 90, at 6; RoSLow, HISPANICS ADULTS, Supra
note 88, at 7.
94. SeeJewel Gopwani, Ads Target Both Worlds, REGISTER (Orange County), Dec. 11,
2004, available at http://www.ocregister.com/ocr/2004/12/11 /sections/news/focusin_
depth/article_340696.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
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Spanish-language programming.95 It would be important to consider
how the program context affects response to advertising.
In 2003, Spanish Broadcasting System sued Clear Channel and
HBC and claimed that Spanish and English-language radio competed
in separate markets because advertisers have separate budgets for
Spanish and English-language radio.96 That case was dismissed with
prejudice for failure to allege an antitrust violation.9 7 As a result,
neither the district court nor the parties recognized that while some
advertisers may divide their budgets by language, others segment their
budgets by ethnicity, race, gender, or other demographic factors.
In opposition to the HBC/Univision merger, SBS filed its survey
of more than twenty advertising agencies and advertisers it character-
ized as having special knowledge of the Hispanic community. 98 From
those comments, SBS concluded "English-language broadcasting and
Spanish-language (Hispanic) broadcasting constitute separate mar-
kets."99 That statement, however, equates Spanish-language with His-
panic, conflating language with ethnicity and blurring the alleged
market distinction.
Some of the SBS commentators defined the relevant markets by
language. Castor Fernandez, President and Creative Director of
Castor, an Advertising Agency, replied as part of SBS's comments that
"English language media and Spanish language media are NOT sub-
stitutable. There definitely is a separate advertising product market
defined by the Spanish language."100 He added that if prices were to
increase, advertisers he works with would absorb the price increase
rather than switch to advertisements in another language.' 0 ' Richard
Cotter, a buyer of radio and television advertising time, commented
that "Spanish language radio and TV stations serve a distinct con-
95. John Authers, Politicians Must Mind Their Language in Wooing Hispanic Vote, Despite
the Success of Spanish Programming, English May Be Better for Addressing the Latino Electorate, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at 4 (advertisements aired in English for movie TROY during soccer
games and soap operas broadcast in Spanish).
96. Spanish Broad. Sys. Inc., v. Clear Channel Commc'ns., Inc. & Hispanic Broad.
Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1358-59 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (for purposes of motion to dismiss,
the district court deferred to SBS's market definition as "advertising allocated to Spanish-
language radio in the top ten markets," but dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to
allege antitrust injury).
97. Id.
98. Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81 (attaching several letters from advertisers and
advertising agencies).
99. Id.
100. Letter from Castor A. Fernandez, President/Creative Dir., Castor, to Whom it May
Concern (May 27, 2003), attached to Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81.
101. Id.
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sumer base with different brand awarene [ss], tastes and prefer-
ences."10 2 Cotter did not elaborate on whether those differences in
consumer preference were related to language or associated with the
ethnicity of the audience.
Other respondents to SBS's request for comments about the
merger distinguished the market by ethnicity, rather than by lan-
guage. 10 3 Mike Herrera commented that Presidente Beer commences
its marketing strategy by identifying "the key markets within our Dem-
ographic group and separate [s] within each market the hispanic and
general market." 10 4
Consistent with Presidente's approach, Interep, a firm that repre-
sents broadcasters in their efforts to sell airtime to advertisers, com-
mented on its website, "When it comes to marketing on radio,
advertisers don't focus on formats. They focus on consumers."105 In-
terep has established seven consumer types: "Affluent, African-Ameri-
can, Family, Hispanic, Men, Women, Young Adults."10 6
Rather than establish "industry or public recognition" of Spanish-
language radio "as a separate economic entity" under Brown Shoe, 0 7
these statements indicate that some advertisers define the market by
ethnicity rather than by language. Some marketers recognize that En-
glish media is an important part of the strategy to effectively reach
Hispanic listeners. To that end, Raquel Tomasino recommended ad-
vertising in both languages to reach Hispanics: "Nationally, 10% of
total dollars should go to Spanish, 4% to English-Hispanic; in L.A.,
30% to Spanish, 11-18% to English-Hispanic."108 These comments in-
dicate that the use of media by Hispanics in both English and Spanish
must be examined to determine the relevant antitrust product
market.
102. Letter from Richard Cotter, Senior Partner, USA Dir. of Local Broad., MindShare,
to Whom it May Concern, (May 21, 2003), attached to Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81.
103. Tomasino Letter, supra note 81; Letter from Linda Lane Gonzalez, President, The
Viva Partnership, Inc., to Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC (n.d.), attached to Willkie Farr
Letter, supra note 81 (United States Hispanic media market is separate as distinguished by
culture, language, customs and traditions).
104. Letter from Mike Herrera, Presidente U.S.A., to Michael Powel [sic], FCC (May
23, 2003), attached to Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81.
105. Interep, Research and Publications, Consumer Lifestyles Network, available at
http://www.interep.com/publications/cln (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
106. Id.
107. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
108. Tomasino Letter, supra note 81.
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B. Consumer Substitution Between Languages and Formats
Language usage by Hispanics in the United States provides some
insight into public perception of substitutability between radio for-
mats, which is relevant to "industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity" under Brown Shoe.'09 In the year
2000, almost twenty-nine million Americans spoke Spanish at
home. 10 Of those, 51% reported speaking English "very well," while
10% reported they did not speak English "at all.""' This data indi-
cates a range of language abilities and preferences among Hispanics
and Spanish-speakers. Linguistic data must be correlated with media
usage to examine the extent of product substitutability between En-
glish and Spanish radio.
The American Antitrust Institute ("AAI"), in its comments on the
HBC/Univision merger, cited evidence that 9% of United States His-
panics do not speak English at all, at least 15% do not speak English
well, and 75% of Hispanic adults in the top ten Hispanic metropolitan
areas most frequently speak Spanish. 112 From these figures, AAI con-
cluded that a "significant section of the Spanish-speaking community
in the U.S. is highly dependent on information it receives in Spanish
and that English is in these situations an inadequate substitute."' 13
AAI criticized the DOJ's Competitive Impact Statement for lacking in-
formation on the percentage of Spanish-speaking consumers in the
United States who are completely or highly dependent on Spanish-
language sources of information.' 14 In a dissent to the FCC's approval
of the merger, Commissioners Adelstein and Copps argued that
"[l]anguage serves as a communications link, or a communications
barrier, to cultural and civic participation in our multicultural soci-
ety... it is not a mere broadcasting format, but a threshold factor for
whether a message is even understood."'"t 5
Data from Arbitron, a company that tracks radio listening, indi-
cates that even for people who describe themselves as speaking only
Spanish, language is not a complete deterrent to listening to the radio
in other languages. Arbitron reported that among those who filled out
109. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
110. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 6.
111. Id.
112. Letter from Albert A. Foer, The Am. Antitrust Inst., to James R. Wade, Chief,
Litig. III Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice 4 (June 12, 2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201500/201510a.htm.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3-4.
115. Adelstein/Copps Statement, supra note 29, at 5.
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"diaries" used to rate radio stations in summer 2003 through winter
2004, "around three-fourths of the radio listening from all di-
arykeepers who say they speak 'all Spanish' goes to Spanish-language
radio."116 This implies that, 25% of diarykeepers who speak "all Span-
ish" also listened to English or other formats.1 17 Univision submitted
research to the FCC showing that Hispanics in the geographical mar-
kets in which HBC operated spent more than 53% of their radio lis-
tening time tuned to English-language formats.11 8
In its 2005 survey of Hispanic Radio listening, Arbitron reported
that "Mexican Regional" was the favorite Spanish-language format of
United States Hispanics. 11 9 The second most popular format among
Hispanics was "Contemporary Hit Radio," ("CHR") an English-lan-
guage format.120 Nearly 82% of Hispanic CHR listeners are under age
thirty-five. 12' Additionally, teens account for almost one-third of the
Hispanic CHR audience. 122
The divergence in radio preferences between Hispanic adults
and teenagers highlights the importance of distinguishing the particu-
lar product market at issue in this merger. Advertisers wishing to
reach Hispanic teenagers, or Hispanics of all ages, might develop dif-
ferent strategies than those wishing to reach Hispanic adults. The
DOJ's analysis did not address these distinctions.
Beginning in 2001, the AOL Time Warner Foundation and Peo-
ple En Espafiol commissioned the research group Cheskin to conduct
a "Hispanic Opinion Tracker," a national random survey of 4000 His-
116. Arbitron, Why Language Preference?, MAs ALLA DE LOS RATINGS, WINTER 2004,
http://www.arbitron.com/radiostations/english/MA WI04 4.htm (last visited Aug. 10,
2005) (percentages vary by market).
117. See id.
118. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18857 n.129 (2003).
119. ARBITRON, HISPANIC RADIO TODAY, How AMERICA LISTENS TO RADIO 13 (2005),
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/hispanicradiotoday05.pdf (last visited July 10,
2005). Format share is defined by Arbitron as "[t] he percentage of those listening to radio
in the Metro [relevant geographic market] who are listening to a particular radio station
format." Id. at 52. This is calculated by dividing the Average-Quarter-Hour ("AQH") Per-
sons listening to a specific format, by the AQH Persons listening to all formats. Id. AQH
persons is defined as "[t]he average number of persons listening to a particular [radio]
station for at least five minutes during a 15-minute period." Id. Mexican Regional garnered
a 17.9 AQH share in Arbitron's 2005 report. Id. at 22.
120. CHR attracted a 14.0 AQH share of Hispanic Radio Listening, Monday-Sunday,
6AM-Midnight, for persons 12 and over, topping the second largest Spanish-language for-
mat, "Spanish Contemporary," which garnered an AQH share of 11.3%. Id. at 21, 29.
121. Id. at 21.
122. Id.
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panics and 2000 non-Hispanics. 23 Their report found that Hispanics
on average listened to 4.16 hours of radio in English per week and
5.88 hours of radio in "Spanish/other.'1 24 During each week, 60% of
Hispanics listen to Spanish-language radio, while 67% listen to En-
glish-language radio. 125
The extensive bilingual use of radio for Hispanics undercuts the
assertion that the Spanish and English-language radio markets are
completely separate and do not compete. Many advertisers are aware
through this and other research of the extent of English listening by
Hispanics. This indicates that English radio may be a substitute, or at
least part of the media mix for Hispanic listeners and the advertisers
who wish to reach them.
Another important data resource to examine would be Arbitron's
numbers indicating the overlap or duplication between different sta-
tions' listeners. Duplication indicates how many listeners station X
and station Y share. HBC claimed that "[o] n average, Spanish radio
stations duplicate less than 10% with English language stations."'126
With the addition of many new Spanish and Spanglish formats, as well
as English formats that appeal to Hispanic audiences, it would be im-
portant to examine this data to determine the willingness of listeners
to choose programming in different languages or formats. This data is
proprietary to Arbitron. The resources necessary to examine Spanish-
English and bilingual format duplication in representative sample
markets exceed the resources currently available for this Article. Nev-
ertheless, it is important for this data to be explored, taking into con-
sideration the effect of formats offered in the market on audience
overlap and the influence of companies that control multiple stations.
C. Language and Format Definition
The process of defining the relevant antitrust market requires a
determination of what should be included or excluded from the mar-
ket definition. The mix of languages broadcasters and audiences use
123. See Press Release, Time Warner, Hispanic Opinion Tracker Study Finds Hispanics
Holding to Cultural Identity While Pursuing American Dream; Wide Issue Differences Be-
tween Hispanics and Non-Hispanics (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.timewarner.
com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,669551,00.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
124. FELIPE KORZENNY & Lou LOPEZ, HisPANIcs AND ENTERTAINMENT, INSIGHTS FOR CuL-
TURALLY RELEVANT MARKETING 4 (2003), available at http://www.cheskin.com/docs/Sites/
1/article-HACRKorzennyLopez2003.pdf (last visited July 11, 2005). The authors do not
explain the "Spanish/other" category and whether it includes bilingual formats.
125. See Clancy & Krieg, supra note 86.
126. Adelstein/Copps Statement, supra note 29, at 12.
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confounds the attempt to define the market by language. The Univi-
sion/HBC merger market definition assumes a precise boundary be-
tween English and Spanish. Latinos and others in the United States
have long mixed the two languages, creating new words in both lan-
guages in the process. 127 Broadcasters recognize the audience on the
borderland of these languages and broadcast in formats mixing Span-
ish and English such as Tejano, Spanglish, and "Hurban 12 (His-
panic/Urban).
The breadth of formats targeting the Hispanic community illus-
trates the difficulty of categorizing a market by language. Hispanic Bus-
iness Magazine reported that "new formats continue to blur the line
between English-preference and Spanish-preference listeners." 129 "Ac-
cording to broadcasters," Hispanic Business Magazine wrote, "typical bi-
lingual listeners in their mid-30s are willing to try both English and
Spanish-language stations."130 Tom Castro commented about the four
English-format and three Spanish-format stations owned by Border
Media Partners, "I would submit that they are all Spanish-formatted
stations."131
Through a bilingual format, the DJ may play two or three English
songs in a row, followed by some bilingual songs and some Spanish
songs. 132 Commercials and public service announcements reflect the
same mix of languages. 133
Clear Channel's actions demonstrate the difficulty of categorizing
a market by language. In 2004, Clear Channel announced plans to
convert up to twenty-five of its 1200 stations from English to Span-
127. SeeJose Armas, The Spanglish Revolution Has Reached the Airwaves, available at
http://www.languages.umd.edu/SpanishPortuguese/spanfac/RLavine/span3l5/spang
lish.html (last visited July 12, 2005).
128. See Cary Darling, Radio Tries to Reach Young Latinos with 'Hurban' Format, avail-
able at http://hoodgame.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=l 1 10&Item
id=0 (last visited July 12, 2005); see also Armas, supra note 127.
129. Brass, supra note 23.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. E.g., Stations 105.7/100.7, KWF-FM/KWZ-FM San Jose and San Francisco, Califor-
nia, heard by the author (Radio broadcast Sept. 7, 2005). The format is labeled "La Kalle,"
slang for the street or la calle in Spanish.
133. For example, on Univision's bilingual Reggaeton station in the San Jose, Califor-
nia market, the soft drink Mountain Dew aired bilingual advertisements, while other adver-
tisements were broadcast in English, Spanish, or a flowing mix of both languages. Id. The
DJs speak in a mixture of both languages, although they sometimes speak only in English,
as they did in a Public Service Announcement discouraging drinking and driving. Id. One
bilingual advertisement on Univision's Reggaeton station reflected the cross-over between
languages and media, announcing the season premier of the English television shows Des-
perate Housewives and Reunion. Id.
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ish. 3 4 As part of this effort, some Clear Channel stations changed to
Spanish formats, while others adopted bilingual formats. In late 2004,
Clear Channel converted its English rock station in Houston to
"Hurban/CHR."13 5 The format, targeted at young Latinos, plays a
"mix of English-language hip-hop tracks along with Afro-Caribbean
rhythms."t 36 Clear Channel has classified stations in Houston, Texas,
Miami, Florida, and Albuquerque, New Mexico as "Hurban." For its
Hurban format in San Antonio, Texas, DJs play a mix of Spanish and
English-language music. The DJs speak Spanglish, flowing in and out
of English and Spanish.137
Reuters reported that as of September 2005, seventeen United
States stations-including former English-language outlets-switched
to rhythmic Latin formats with Reggaeton-dominated playlists. 138 Reg-
gaeton music may be recorded in English, Spanish, or a mix of both
and is played regularly on predominantly English top forty stations
and around the world.1 39 In 2005, Univision changed the format of
eight of its sixty-six radio stations to Reggeaton. 140 The popularity of
such music across cultures, formats, languages, and continents sug-
gests far greater fluidity by audiences and advertisers than the DOJ
conceived of in the Univision/HBC merger.
"Tejano" is another popular format among Hispanics, featuring
Tex-Mex and Mexican music from Northern Mexico.1 4 1 Though only
garnering a 1.1% share of Hispanic listeners nationally, it is almost
134. Press Release, Clear Channel Radio, Clear Channel Radio Announces Aggressive
Multi-Market Roll-out for New Spanish-Language Programming Initiative (Sept. 16, 2004)
available at http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD=740.
135. Christine Hall, Clear Channel Tests New Spanish-Language Format, SAN ANTONIO Bus.
J., Nov. 15, 2004, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/stories/2004/1l/
15/dailyl.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
136. Stations Sing Bilingual Tune, VARiETY, Aug. 15, 2005, at 18, available at 2005 WLNR
13650515; Clifford Pugh, KLOL Suddenly Speaking Spanish, Venerable Rock Station Switches to a
New Format, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 17, 2004, at Al.
137. See L.A. Lorek, Hispanic Radio Is Boosting Clear Channel, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2005, at OIL, available at 2005 WLNR 14390943; Press Release, Clear Chan-
nel Radio, Clear Channel Radio Creates Bilingual "Hurban/CHR" Format for Hispanic
Youth (Nov. 15, 2004).
138. The World: Global Hit (BBC News Radio broadcast Aug. 25, 2005), transcript and
audio available at http://www.theworld.org/globalhits/2005/08/25.shtml; Leila Cobo, Mu-
sic Biz Catching Reggaeton Fever, ABC NEWS.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/En-
tertainment/wireStory?id=1096867 (last accessed Oct. 24, 2005).
139. Reggaeton Music Is Latin Hip-Hop, AHOREE.COM, Apr. 28, 2005, http://www.ahorre.
com/musica/music/hip-hop-en-espanol/reggaeton-music is.latin.hiphop/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2005).
140. Leila Cobo, supra note 138.
141. ARBITRON, supra note 119 at 45.
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five times more popular in Arbitron's South Central region, bordered
by Texas, Kentucky, and Alabama. 142 The format originated in Texas,
as indicated by its name, which means a Texan of Mexican origin. 143
Many Tejano stations feature bilingual DJs who use both languages in
a style that reflects the everyday language of border communities. Al-
buquerque's KABQ radio adopted a bilingual format in the early
1990s. 1 44 "Announcers, newscasters and their editorials combine
Spanish and English words, phrases, sentences. They don't translate;
they switch from English to Spanish at random points in their
speech." 45
Bilingual formats and broadcasters' diversification of the lan-
guage of their programming call into question whether "specialized
vendors" characterize a submarket under the Brown Shoe test.14 6 While
some companies broadcast only in Spanish-language formats, Univi-
sion, Entravision, SBS, and several other companies who target the
Hispanic community also have stations that broadcast exclusively in
English. 147 For example, Entravision bought KBMB-FM in Sacramento
for $17.4 million in 2004 and continued broadcasting its English hip-
hop format (now labeled Contemporary Hit Radio) to complement its
English "Kool" station and its two Spanish-language formats in Sacra-
mento.148 In two cities near the Mexican border, Entravision operates
English-language stations: a country-format station in El Centro, Cali-
fornia, to complement its two Spanish-format stations; and in El Paso,
Texas, an English Oldies format and a Rock format, in addition to
three Spanish stations. 149 Clear Channel's "Hispanic Division" broad-
casts in a range of Spanish, Spanglish, and Latin formats, as discussed
above. This format diversification allows broadcasters to reach a larger
segment of Hispanics, as well as the general market, diversifying its
audience and potential revenue base.
142. Id. at 46.
143. See Chris Strachwitz, The Roots of Tejano and Conjunto Music, http://www.lib.
utexas.edu/benson/border/arhoolie2/raices.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
144. Armas, supra note 127.
145. Id.
146. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
147. See Entravision Commc'n. Corp., All Radio Listing, http://www.entravision.com/
template.cfm?page=media&subpage=radioAll (last visited July 10, 2005) [hereinafter En-
travision Radio Stations]; Spanish Broad. Sys., Stations by Format and Region, http://www.
spanishbroadcasting.com/stations pr.shtml (offering stations playing Contemporary Hit
Radio and 1980s and 1990s hits in Puerto Rico).
148. Entravision Radio Stations, supra note 147; see also Brass, supra note 23.
149. Entravision Radio Stations, supra note 147.
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Some English radio stations also feature Spanish-language artists
as part of their regular line-up. For example, primarily English-lan-
guage Alternative Rock-format station KDLD/KDLE (Indie 103.1 FM)
in Los Angeles, California features Latin-Alternative music every Tues-
day night through a show called "The Red Zone. '150 Indie program-
ming director Michael Steel commented about the music, 'Just
because bands happen to be singing in Spanish doesn't mean the
songs aren't great. We're a rock station and these are rock
bands .... "151
The Red Zone "cater[s] to the vast Latino population, the bilin-
gual population, here in Los Angeles who love the music.., but had
no outlet to hear it."152 The show also has a substantial following
among English speakers. Show hosts and co-creators Chelina Vargas
and Tomas Cookman reported, "they get countless calls from English-
speaking listeners who don't necessarily understand the lyrics but are
nonetheless thrilled to discover the music."'
5 3
Under the DOJ's antitrust analysis in the Univision/HBC merger,
how would one categorize English rock stations that feature Spanish
weekly shows and some Spanish songs in the regular lineup? Would
they fit in the English or the Spanish market? They have some listen-
ers who speak only Spanish, only English or are bilingual. Regardless
of language preference, they tune in because they love the music.
With a large Hispanic listener base including Spanish and bilingual
speakers, would English stations that play Spanish music be an attrac-
tive alternative for advertisers, especially during the Spanish-rock
shows? Hybrid formats, such as Spanish Rock on English stations,
demonstrate the difficulty of classifying the radio market by language
and the lack of specialized vendors under Brown Shoe.
Classification is also challenging for formats with Spanish names
that lean toward English-language music. Would Entravision's "Casa,"
meaning "House" music format in Houston be classified as falling in
the English or Spanish market under the DOJ's definition? Though it
150. Shannon Cook, Welcome to the 'Red Zone,' It's Spanish for Indie-Simply Red, BILL-
BOARD RADIO MONITOR, Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://www.indie1031.fm/static/
downloads/RedZonein Billboard.pdf. (last visited Dec. 17, 2005).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Similarly, in Miami, Florida, English-language modern rock station WZTA
(Zeta) broadcasts a show called "En Fuego," which translates to "On Fire," for two hours
each Sunday night. Id. WZTA's programming director, Troy Hanson, commented that the
typical percentage of Hispanic listeners to the station hovered between 35-42%. Id. With
such a large Hispanic listener base, they decided to develop a program featuring Spanish-
language rock. Id.
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features less Spanish hip-hop and Spanish Rock than Clear Channel's
station labeled Hurban, 154 would the DOJ be more likely to consider
Casa as a participant in the Spanish market because its format name is
in Spanish?
Many English stations also have substantial Latino audiences. The
quintessential rock station in Los Angeles, KROQ reported, "Without
actively seeking to broaden its ethnic appeal, the station, long consid-
ered 'white,' now has a 40 percent Latino audience."' 5 5 Patricia
Suarez, president of advertising firm Suarez/Frommer & Associates,
commented, "Right when everyone is discovering the importance of
using Spanish, we're seeing Latinos become the backbone of the En-
glish-language audience. 1 1 56
Two other factors in the Brown Shoe definition of a submarket are
"the product's peculiar characteristics and uses," and the distinctive-
ness of their customers.1 57 With the increase in bilingual program-
ming, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw the line between
Spanish and Spanglish formats. They may play much of the same mu-
sic and share a portion of their audience. These factors suggest that
each product's characteristics do not make them so peculiar or dis-
tinctive that a submarket is clearly demonstrated.
The attempt to categorize markets by language is confounded by
the nature of language itself. Language is organic and shifts over time,
as evidenced by the Oxford English Dictionary's addition of more
than 3000 new words and expressions in 2003.158 Many common
words in English such as rodeo, lasso, and taco come from Spanish. 159
Author Julia Alvarez commented: "Language is not a little, airtight,
clean, finished container of something .... It's permeable, alive. It
moves."
160
In recognition of the willingness of audiences and advertisers to
listen to programs in different languages, broadcasters such as SBS
and Univision have publicly recognized that English stations are
among their competitors. In its March 31, 2003 Securities and Ex-
154. Darling, supra note 128.
155. See Gregory Rodriguez, The Overwhelming Allure of English, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002,
§ 4, at 3, available at 2002 WLNR 4090070.
156. Id.
157. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
158. Eeyorish Muppets: Go Egosurf the Dictionary, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 2003, at A15.
159. Gerald Erichsen, Spanish Words Become Our Own, Adopted and Borrowed
Words Enrich English, http://www.spanish.about.com/cs/historyofspanish/a/spanishloan
word.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
160. Alvarez, supra note 1, at Al.
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change Commission Form 10-K, SBS stated that "[e]ach of [its] radio
stations compete with both Spanish-language and English-language
radio stations in the market .... -1161 Univision describes its television
network as the "fifth most-watched full-time network overall, compet-
ing head-to-head with the English-language television networks in
primetime seven nights a week." 62
These statements may be intended to attract potential advertisers,
as well as investors, who may overlook both the size of the Hispanic
audience, and its competitiveness with English. SBS's assertions con-
flict with its position before the FCC that there is a "separate Spanish-
language (Hispanic) market."' 63 More information about broadcaster
perceptions of competition would inform the analysis of the market
definition and participation. These perceptions will likely shape plans
for future market entry, as well as current competition.
This section has demonstrated the difficulty of determining
which formats would be included within the DOJ's definition of Span-
ish programming. Excluding bilingual programming from the anti-
trust market definition, including that played on predominantly
English stations, would create incentives to provide such program-
ming to escape antitrust confines. Without doubt broadcasters offer
bilingual formats because there is a demand for them. However, the
DOJ's market definition also encourages firms to diversify their pro-
gramming so as not to be limited in growth by operating in a smaller
antitrust market defined by language. As a result, less Spanish pro-
gramming may be provided, potentially harming both audiences and
advertisers who wish to reach them.
D. Format vs. Market Def'mition
The diversity of formats illustrates the importance of understand-
ing the target markets served by the formats and the potential overlap
between them. Radio formats must also be distinguished from radio
markets; one is related to programming, the other to the
demographics of the market in which they compete. A review of some
of the DOJ's decisions in other radio merger cases illustrates the im-
portance of this distinction.
161. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18855 (2003).
162. Univision Network, Univision Media Properties, http://www.univisionet/corp/
en/univision.jsp (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
163. Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81.
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In the proposed merger between Triathlon Broadcasting and
Capstar, the DOJ noted that "Capstar currently controls 20.3% and
Triathlon controls 32.8% of Wichita metro market radio advertising
revenues." 164 The DOJ looked at likely dominance of key demo-
graphic groups that many advertisers are interested in reaching. The
DOJ concluded that Capstar controlled 24.6% of adults ages twenty-
five to fifty-four, while Triathlon controlled 39.6%. If the acquisition
proceeded as planned, Capstar would control 54.0% of this
demographic.1 65
Similarly, the DOJ concluded that the merger of Jacor and Citi-
casters would substantially lessen competition. 166 The DOJ noted that
prior to the mergerJacor controlled 42% of all radio advertising reve-
nues in Cincinnati, and that share would rise to 53% after the pro-
posed merger. 16 7
The DOJ uses a formula called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI") to indicate whether the proposed merger would produce un-
due market concentration.' 68 The index is "calculated by summing
the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants." 169
An HHI index below 1000 is presumed to be unconcentrated17 0 An
index above 1800 is considered highly concentrated. 171 While the DOJ
did not provide details on exactly how it defined the market, it noted
thatJacor's HHI would rise from a pre-merger level of 2180 to 3077
after the merger.172 As a condition of merger's approval, the DOJ re-
quiredjacor to sell WRKQ-FM, a radio station that catered to eighteen
to thirty-four years olds.' 73
Though concerned about potential domination of the eighteen
to thirty-four year old audience segment, the DOJ did not define the
market in the Jacor merger as eighteen to thirty-four year olds for
164. Triathlon Petition, supra note 39, at 10.
165. Id. at 13.
166. United States v. Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,671, at
78,735 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1996), 1996 WL 784589. Jacor was acquired by Clear Channel
in September 1999. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Approves Clear
Channel's Acquisition of Jacor Communications After Parties Agree to Merger (April 22,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/2388.htm (last
visited Aug. 17, 2005).
167. Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,671, at 78,735.
168. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41557-58, § 1.5 (Sept.
10, 1992) (never codified).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,671, at 78,738.
173. Id.
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purposes of the HHI analysis. The DOJ based its analysis on control of
advertising revenues on the whole market, not just the eighteen to
thirty-four year old market.1 74 Since the market was not defined by
format, the issue of cross-elasticity of demand by format-that is the
substitutability of one format for another-was not addressed. It is
also noteworthy that the age-range target was not defined by language,
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or other demographic char-
acteristics besides age. It is presumed that the station's broadcast lan-
guage was English.
It is unclear whether "all advertising revenues" in the Jacor deci-
sion included revenue from Spanish formatted stations or only from
English stations. If it included only English formats, then a parallel
analysis of Spanish broadcasters should look at competition within
subformats of Spanish radio (such as the demographics targeted by
Mexican Regional or Spanish Talk) and control of "all advertising rev-
enues." Some Spanish stations target twenty-five to fifty-five year olds
who listen to Spanish music, while others target audiences fifty-five
and over. 175 Under the Univision/HBC merger approach, "Spanish"
became both the format and the market definition, in contrast to the
approach in the Jacor merger.
The two approaches produce different incentives. Based on the
Jacor precedent, would broadcasters have a disincentive to target eigh-
teen to thirty-four year old English listeners, or thirty-five to fifty year
old English listeners, to ensure that their companies will be allowed to
grow? Jacor suggests that if you merge with entities that target the same
demographic through the same format, some of the overlapping sta-
tions may be subject to divestiture, depending on the HHI concentra-
tion levels of the merged entities as measured by "all of the advertising
revenues." If their control of the overall market's advertising revenues
would not be higher than allowed after the merger under the Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines, no divestitures may be required, even
though they compete in the same format. Additionally, companies
might avoid divestitures by changing their formats (in good faith) in
advance of merger negotiations. Even if companies keep their for-
mats, and there is overlap, Jacor suggests the divestiture target will not
be all English stations, but rather the overlapping subformats, i.e., sta-
174. Id.
175. For example, Mexican Regional format is especially popular among twenty-five to
forty-four year olds, who account for 55% of the format's audience, while Spanish Talk is
popular among people ages fifty-five and over who account for half of the format's audi-
ence. ARBrITRON, supra note 119, at 25, 33.
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tions targeting eighteen to thirty-four year olds. The Jacor approach
would not likely undermine provision of service to eighteen to thirty-
four year old listeners.
For companies specializing in Spanish broadcasting who wish to
merge, the Univision decision suggests the divestiture target may be
all of their Spanish stations competing in the same market. The Univi-
sion/HBC decision did not address whether such divestitures may be
required where the stations target different demographics through
their Spanish-language formats. The distinction between format and
market should be considered in future mergers, as it was in the Jacor
and Triathlon decisions.
E. FCC Policies Distinguishing Between Format and Market
in Radio
The FCC's treatment of Spanish radio as a format, rather than a
market, led to its approval of the Univision/HBC merger in Septem-
ber 2003.176 The FCC's consent to the merger was based on the oppo-
site conclusion from the DOJ's-that there was no separate Spanish-
language market. lv Examining the FCC's treatment of Spanish radio
as a format, rather than a market, is key to understanding the history
and structure of the industry as directed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.178 and Brown Shoe.
The Communications Act of 1934 requires the FCC to determine
whether the transfer of an FCC license that would occur as part of a
merger would serve "the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity. ''179 In applying the public interest standard, the FCC first consid-
ers whether the proposed merger would be consistent with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and rules that govern how many
stations a single entity may control in a geographical market.180
A majority of FCC Commissioners approved the Univision/HBC
merger, following FCC precedent that concluded Spanish radio is not
176. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18834-35 (2003).
177. Id. at 18868.
178. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1973) (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962)) (merger has to be viewed func-
tionally, in the context of its particular history, structure and industry).
179. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000). The public interest
standard is the "touchstone of authority" for the FCC. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 138 (1940).
180. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000); His-
panic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. at 18872-73.
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a separate market. 18' In 1995, the FCC rejected the theory that a li-
cense transfer application should be denied based on the definition of
the market as "Spanish radio" in a case involving the Spanish Radio
Networks' ("SRN") application to transfer radio licenses in Miami,
Florida to Heftel (a predecessor to HBC). 182 In SRN, the FCC con-
cluded that the multiple ownership rules did not "indicate that the
goal of enhancing diversity is furthered by defining the relevant mar-
ket in terms of the languages in which radio stations broadcast."'183
The Commission noted that the multiple ownership rules were
"crafted in terms of an entire broadcast 'audience,' including both
Spanish speakers and others. 18 4
The FCC expressed concern that such a construction of the rules
might prohibit the potential merger of Spanish competitors because
of the small number of Spanish broadcasters. The FCC observed that
"in markets with only two or three Spanish language stations (unlike
Miami where there [were] more than seven such stations), there
would be virtually no situation where common ownership would be
permitted.1 85 Moreover, the FCC expressed concern that "to segre-
gate the radio metro market for ownership purposes into Spanish-lan-
guage and English-language stations might allow the acquisition of a
Spanish station by the owner of an English station where the com-
bined audience share exceeded 25 percent" allowed under the multi-
ple ownership rules. 18 6 The FCC concluded, "These results clearly
were not intended by the current rule. '18 7
In the Univision/HBC merger, the FCC majority cited the SRN
case as precedent for the proposition that Spanish-language program-
ming does not constitute a separate market for purposes of evaluating
the "public interest" or applying the multiple ownership rules. 8 8 If
the FCC had reversed course from its previous decision and applied a
format-based limit on transfers, it would have effectively changed the
application of the multiple ownership rules established by the Tele-
181. Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. at 18867-68.
182. Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, 9956. (1995).
183. Id. at 9955.
184. Id. at 9956.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18867-68 (2003) (citing Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, 9956 (1995));
Changes in Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (rely on
the marketplace to determine formats to promote broadcast diversity and maximize eco-
nomic welfare).
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communications Act of 1996 without notice, comment, or statutory
authority.18 9
The FCC is forbidden by its constituting statute, the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, from engaging in censorship.' 90 In Turner Broadcast-
ing System v. FCC,19' the Supreme Court stressed that the "FCC's
oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any par-
ticular type of programming that must be offered by broadcast sta-
tions."' 92 Since 1976, the Commission has held that format choice
should not be dictated by government regulation, but left to market
forces.193 To restrict license transfers because of the format or the lan-
guage of the format in which the parties broadcast, would raise con-
cerns under the Communications Act and the First Amendment. Such
a policy would unduly interfere in programming decisions because it
would be impose additional burdens on transactions within small or
minority formats.
Following these precedents, the FCC applied the same standards
in evaluating the Univision/HBC proposed merger as it would for the
merger of any competitors. The FCC majority found that the "wide
variety of programming alternatives available to Spanish-speaking
audiences; the ease of entry into the Spanish-language format; and
the viewing patterns of Hispanics do not indicate that the Hispanic or
Spanish-speaking audience constitutes a separate, insular 'diversity' or
competition market."194 The FCC majority emphasized the evidence
indicating ease of entry into Spanish formats and format changes be-
tween languages as indicators that no "competitive harms" resulted
from the proposed merger. 195 The FCC majority argued that approv-
ing the merger would serve the public interest because it would "give
Hispanic media a better opportunity to compete against big media
companies, capturing more advertising revenue to allow it to expand
unique language and cultural offerings to its audiences."1 9 6
189. The FCC concluded that the theory that Spanish-language radio was a separate
market for multiple ownership purposes would require a generic rulemaking to change
the multiple ownership rules. Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. at 9956.
190. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000).
191. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
192. Id. at 650.
193. Changes in Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d at 858.
194. FCC UVN/HBC News Release, supra note 26.
195. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18869-70 (2003).
196. Press Statement, Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Kathleen Q. Abernathy &
KevinJ. Martin, Comm'rs, FCC, Transfer of Control of Certain Subsidiaries of the Hispanic
Broadcasting Corporation to Univision Communications, Inc. I (Sept. 22, 2003), available
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FCC Commissioners Michael Copps and Jonathan Adelstein ar-
gued that the FCC should have conducted a hearing to inquire into
whether there is a separate market.197 Both Commissioners dissented
from the majority, and Commissioner Adelstein argued that post-
merger, Univision would likely "control two-thirds of the rising $2.5
billion spent by advertisers on Spanish-language broadcast media."'198
The FCC majority noted that the combined Univision/HBC
would own fifty-one of 222 Spanish-language television stations and
sixty-seven of 706 Spanish-language radio stations then operating.1 99
With the entry of Clear Channel, Infinity, and ABC Radio Network
into Spanish radio since the merger, Univision's proportionate con-
trol of both total radio stations broadcasting in Spanish and advertis-
ing revenue has likely decreased.
One commentator about the FCC's approval of the merger ar-
gued that the FCC's grant of a "permanent waiver" to Spanish-format
television networks, including Univision and Telemundo, from the
FCC's Network Representation Rule indicates that the FCC has
treated Spanish-language television as a separate market.200 The Net-
work Representation Rule prohibits stations, other than those owned
and operated by a television network, from being represented by the
network in the non-network advertising sales market.201 The rule was
designed to preserve competition between networks and affiliates for
national advertisements. In 1990, the FCC granted Spanish language
television networks a waiver of that rule for the purpose of "encourag-
ing the growth and development of new networks; fostering foreign-
language programming; increasing programming diversity; strength-
ening competition among stations; and fostering a competitive UHF
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-239081A2.pdf (last visited
Aug. 17, 2005)) [hereinafter UVN/HBC FCC Majority Press Statement].
197. Press Statement, Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, FCC, Shareholders of Hispanic
Broadcasting Corporation (Transferor) and Univision Communications, Inc. (Transferee)
for Transfer of Control of Hispanic Broadcasting and Certain Subsidiaries, Licensees of
KGBT (AM), Harlingen, TX et al. 2 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-239081A3.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005)); Adelstein/
Copps Statement, supra note 29, at 2.
198. Press Statement, Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, FCC, Una Vision para los que
Hablan Espafiol en los Estados Unidos "One Vision" for United States Spanish Speakers 2
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs._public/attachmatch/DOC-
239081A4.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005).
199. UVN/HBC Majority Press Statement, supra note 196 at 3.
200. Nicole Serratore, How Do You Say 'Big Media' in Spanish? Spanish-Language Media
Regulation and the Implications of the Univision-Hispanic Broadcasting Merger on the Public Inter-
est, 15 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 203, 226-27 (2004).
201. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(i) (2005).
[Vol. 40
Winter 2006]
service." 20 2 The FCC has granted other waivers in the television and
cable marketplace to promote Spanish programming.
20 3
The FCC reviewed the Network Representation waiver during the
Univision/HBC merger review. Though FCC Commissioners Copps
and Adelstein questioned the continued justification for that waiver in
light of Univision's 2002 market capitalization of $7.8 billion and net
revenues of more than $1 billion,2 0 4 the FCC left the television market
waiver in place.
It should also be stressed that the DOJ and the FCC have long
distinguished between the television and radio markets. 20 5 The waiver
of certain FCC rules for Spanish-language television stations does not
indicate that Spanish radio would be granted such a waiver, or treated
by the FCC as a separate marketplace. Moreover, in the radio market
no such waivers have been granted.
Though the FCC has encouraged program diversity, it has not
treated Spanish broadcasters as if they competed in a separate market.
Until the early 1990s, the FCC considered several factors including
proposed program service to determine who would receive a broad-
cast license. 20 6 Applicants were given a "plus" in the Comparative
Hearing process for proposing programming not currently offered in
the community. 2 7 Even when the FCC considered programming in
the licensing process, it was only one of several factors, including in-
dustry experience and financial ability.20 8 All of those "qualitative" fac-
tors, including proposed format, were usually outweighed by whether
202. Amendment of § 73.658(i) of the Commission's Rules Concerning Network Rep-
resentation of Television Stations in National Spot Sales, FCC 90-364, 5 F.C.C.R. 7280
(1990).
203. In 2002, the FCC granted NBC a waiver allowing it to keep three television sta-
tions in the Los Angeles market for twelve months (the rules allowed common ownership
of no more than two television stations in that market), when NBC acquired Telemundo, a
Spanish-language television network. In re Telemundo Commc'ns Group, Inc., 17 F.C.C.R.
6958 (2002). The waiver was based on the Commission's finding that Telemundo's Span-
ish-language television station did not compete directly with NBC's television broadcasts in
English to a wider audience. Id. See also Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 96 (1972) (cable networks allowed to
carry out-of-market foreign-language stations without counting them against their quota of
distant non-network stations).
204. Adelstein/Copps Statement, supra note 29, at 18-19.
205. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18868-69 (2003).
206. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-99
(1965).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 394-99.
ANTITRUST
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the proposed owner of a station committed to full-time
management. 209
For over a decade, the FCC has not taken program diversity into
account in radio licensing. In 1993 Congress authorized the FCC to
use auctions to determine who would get licenses to operate services
using the radio spectrum, such as are required by radio, television, or
mobile telephones.2 10 The FCC does not currently offer any credits or
incentives for program diversity. 211
Most broadcast licenses are acquired through transfers from in-
cumbent broadcasters. In that context, the FCC has specially declined
to consider format, as discussed above. In deciding whether to ap-
prove the transfer, the FCC inquires whether it would serve the "pub-
lic interest, convenience, and necessity."212
The FCC's actions in the Univision/HBC merger and in prior
radio transactions indicate that the FCC has not recognized or treated
Spanish radio as a separate market. The FCC's actions are relevant to
understanding the regulatory distinction between format and market.
They should also inform antitrust understanding of the structure and
contours of the radio marketplace, which General Dynamics and Brown
Shoe required be considered in analyzing the relevant market.213
F. Pricing Differentials-Relationship to Market Definition and
Participation
Two other factors in the Brown Shoe submarket definition are "dis-
tinct prices" and "sensitivity to price changes." 21 4 In general, advertis-
ers pay lower prices for advertisements on Spanish and other minority-
oriented formats than for "General Market" English-language for-
mats.215 However, lower prices do not establish Spanish as a separate
market and instead may be due to the advertising industry's underval-
uing of minority consumers.
209. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ruling that the FCC has not
justified integration of management into ownership as a criteria in awarding broadcast
licenses).
210. Balanced Budget Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1993) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000)).
211. See, e.g., Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Auction Procedures for Commercial
Broadcast Licenses (Aug. 7, 1998) available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/
NewsReleases/1998/nrmm8O25.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000).
213. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1973) (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962)).
214. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
215. OFORI, supra note 70, at 2.
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The FCC commissioned a study on minority-owned and format-
ted radio that found a pattern of "minority discounts" whereby sta-
tions that broadcast in formats targeted to racial or ethnic minorities
earned less per listener than did stations that targeted the "General
Market."216 The study's author, Kofi Ofori, found that "general mar-
ket stations averaged revenues that were 12% greater than minority-
formatted stations."217 His survey of minority-owned broadcasters re-
vealed that "sixty-one percent of the advertisements purchased on
their stations were discounted. The average amount of the discount
was estimated to be 59 percent."218
Philip Napoli documented the same phenomena in his analysis of
461 commercial radio stations where revenue and audience racial or
ethnic composition data was available. 21 9 He found that stations whose
audience was more than 50% Hispanic or African-American earned
less relative to their audience size than did stations with predomi-
nantly white audiences. 220
Napoli analyzed the "power ratios" of stations (their ability to
convert audience share into revenues), along with several other fac-
tors such as audience demographics and station signal strength. 221 A
power ratio greater than 1.0 "suggests that a station is able to capture
a share of advertising dollars that exceeds its share of the total audi-
ence," while ratios below 1.0 indicate that a broadcaster reaps less ad-
vertising revenues than its audience share would predict.222 Napoli
found that stations "with a minority audience of greater than 50% ...
have an average power ratio of .82, compared with an average power
ratio of 1.06 for other stations. ' 223 While Napoli's study focused on
audience composition rather than format, it supports the general the-
sis that those who serve minorities are paid less.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 15.
218. Id. at iii.
219. Napoli, supra note 5, at 177.
220. Id. Napoli focused on audience composition and its relationship to revenues. His
analysis includes stations that were not specifically formatted or labeled as "minority-
targeted," but have large minority audiences. This category would also likely include sta-
tions that are specifically targeted at Hispanic, Spanish-speaking, African-American and
other racial or ethnic minority audiences. Id. at 174.
221. Id. at 172.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 177. Napoli found that in his sample of 121 stations with minority audiences
greater than 50% and 340 stations which did not have such audiences, the power ratio
difference was statistically significant. Id.
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Explanations proffered for these price differences include lower
average incomes for minority audiences, product consumption pat-
terns, and media usage patterns.224 Ofori concluded: "stations that
program to minority listeners are excluded based on average listener
income, regardless of data about consumption patterns."225 Napoli's
study did not include an analysis of income and other audience demo-
graphic data, in part because of the costs of obtaining such data. 226
Napoli concluded that the "limited availability of audience income
data to advertisers likely limits the extent to which such data are em-
ployed in media buying decisions."227 A 1997 study by James Webster
and Patricia Phalen found that markets with higher proportions of
non-white populations were associated with lower advertising prices to
reach television viewers in the market.228 Napoli commented that the
Webster and Phalen study "controlled for income variations across
market, suggesting that ethnicity was not simply a proxy for
income."229
Instead, advertising prices on stations serving ethnic and racial
minorities may be based on general perceptions of the station's audi-
ence, which may be shaped by preconceived notions or stereotypes. 230
The FCC's Report on Minority Ownership in Broadcasting docu-
mented this phenomena twenty years earlier in 1978, stating that a
"preconceived notion, on the part of some advertisers, is that minority
consumers are unimportant and do not represent a particularly lucra-
tive market. Consequently, advertisers are less inclined to purchase
time on minority-owned stations."'2 3 '
The desire not to have racial and ethnic minorities patronize the
goods or services of a potential advertiser motivates some buying deci-
sions.232 The manager of an "Urban" station targeted at African-Amer-
icans, WBGE-FM, reported that one potential advertiser said bluntly,
' Your station will bring too many Black people to my place of busi-
ness." 23 3 Luis Alvarez, Local Sales Manager for WSKQ-FM in New
York, reported that one advertising agency told their salesperson that
224. Id. at 171-72.
225. OFoRI, supra note 70, at 12.
226. Napoli, supra note 5, at 175.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 172 (citing JAMEs G. WEBSTER & PATRicLA F. PHALEN, THE MASS AUDIENCE:
REDISCOVERING THE DOMINANT MODEL 64 (1997)).
229. Id.
230. OFORI, supra note 70, at 32.
231. Id. at 2.
232. OFoRI, supra note 70, at 36, 39, 46.
233. Id. at 42.
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Macy's did not advertise in the Hispanic market out of fears their pil-
ferage would increase.234 In a memorandum used to train its sales
force, Katz Radio Group, a firm that represents broadcasters in at-
tempts to sell to advertisers, repeatedly referred to African-Americans
and Hispanics as "suspects," rather than "prospects.' 235 Katz issued an
apology in 1999 for that memo.236
The FCC study also documented refusals to advertise on minority
formatted stations, a practice called "No Urban Dictates" or "No Span-
ish Dictates." Ofori reported that in response to his study's survey of
minority-owned broadcast stations, "ninety-one percent indicated that
they had encountered a 'no Urban/Spanish dictate' at least once
from the advertising agencies of advertisers from which they solicit
business."23 7 Ofori commented, "Blanket dictates based on a station's
format preclude a broadcaster from competing for the advertisement
of goods or service [s] .... Rather than evaluating a station based on
its individual merits-its rating, its particular audience characteristics,
the price of ads-the station is excluded based on its minority for-
mat."2 38 The FCC's 1978 Report on Minority Ownership in Broadcast-
ing also documented this practice, stating that advertising "[a] gencies
claim that their clients impose a 'no ethnic' restriction on the advertis-
ing medium used due to the nature of the product."239
The net effect is that "General Market" stations not targeted at
minority groups earn more.240 The Washington Post reported that in
2003, Spanish-language television constituted 5% of the nation's audi-
ence, but reaped only 2% of the nation's television advertising.2 41
Univision claimed that in 2003, 60% of all national advertisers did not
advertise in Spanish.242
Kevin Brass reported in Hispanic Business magazine that broad-
casters hoped to end the "Hispanic discount," "the widely accepted
234. Id.
235. Id. at 43.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 29.
238. Id. at 30.
239. OFORI, supra note 70, at 28 (quoting FCC MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, MI-
NORITY OWNERSHIP REPORT 26 (1978)).
240. See OFORI, supra note 70, at 2; see also Napoli, supra note 5, at 177.
241. Frank Ahrens & Krissah Williams, Spanish Language Media Expand, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 2003, at A1O.
242. Press Release, Univision, Univision Completes Merger with Hispanic Broadcast-
ing, HBC's Radio Assets Will Complement Univision's Television, Music and Internet As-
sets (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/LosAngeles_22
092003-2.html.
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practice of advertisers paying less for a spot on a Spanish-language
station than a similar spot on an English-language station."243 Some
broadcasters estimated that advertisers pay 40% less to advertise on
Spanish stations. 244 While overall revenue for the radio market was
flat, stations with Spanish-language formats were posting double-digit
growth. 245 Hispanic Business reported that nonetheless, "the audience
for Hispanic radio is growing so fast that some broadcasters believe
the gap between revenue and audience share is actually growing."2 46
There is complex interplay between format and pricing patterns.
Ofori found that some broadcasters changed the label of their formats
in an effort to avoid minority discounts and "No Urban" or "No Span-
ish" dictates. 247 Napoli's analysis shows those name changes did not
obviate lower prices when the audience was largely composed of
minorities. 248
The advertising industry's practice of minority discounts is not
unique to Spanish formats or to other minority-labeled formats. It re-
flects industry perceptions of minority audiences. Lower prices do not
distinguish Spanish formats, as compared to other stations serving
predominantly minority audiences. They may also be applied to En-
glish stations attracting large minority audiences and likely occur with
bilingual stations. 249 Thus, caution should be used in asserting that
lower prices establish that Spanish radio is a separate market since this
characteristic is shared by English stations serving primarily racial or
ethnic minorities.
Jonathan Baker discussed the limits of pricing data as evidence of
a separate market in his article on antitrust submarkets. 250 Baker ques-
tioned the justice Department's approach to the use of pricing data in
the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Staples Inc. 251 In analyzing the
proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot, market definition was
the pivotal issue in that case. The court considered whether the rele-
243. Brass, supra note 23.
244. Id.
245. Id. (quoting George Nadel Rivin, partner in charge of broadcast services for
Miller, Kaplan, Arase & Co., a Los Angeles-based accounting firm that tracks media).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 78 n.210.
248. Id. at 16.
249. Ofori classified as "Spanish" format programming targeted to the Hispanic com-
munity, whether provided in the Spanish-language or in a Spanish-English bilingual for-
mat. OFoRI, supra note 70, at 8 n.35.
250. Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Sub-
markets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 212 (2000).
251. 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
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vant product market was "office superstores" or "all suppliers of office
products." The FTC presented evidence that:
Staples charged significantly higher prices-at least 5 percent and
as much as 13 percent higher-in geographic markets where it had
no office superstore competition than in markets where it com-
peted with the two other superstore chains, notwithstanding the
presence of a wide range of non-superstore retailers of office
supplies.2 52
Baker cautioned against using pricing evidence as a basis for de-
fining a market, arguing that "if the answer to the ultimate question
(whether price will rise) is the basis for market definition, market defi-
nition and market concentration are conclusory, not an autonomous
method of analysis. ' 253 The question is whether there is a separate
market, and pricing is one factor in that analysis under the Brown Shoe
standard.254
The approach in the Staples case suggests that the effect of com-
petition on pricing in the market should be analyzed, not simply the
level of pricing in the market. The price behavior of firms subsequent
to radio mergers should be analyzed, taking into account price growth
in the industry and format and the response of competitors. That
analysis should consider whether prices shift in response to other fac-
tors such as general economic trends, income increases in the pre-
dominant audience group, and population growth. 255 Pricing analysis
should examine the impact of stations commonly owned by one entity
on pricing in formats and across station groups. The relationship be-
tween format and price should also be examined, accounting for
other variables such as multiple ownership, station power and market
share within and across languages, demographic groups and formats.
No such record exists for this case. In the Univision/HBC
merger, the record was not fully developed regarding many of the
Brown Shoe factors including price, largely because the parties settled
and agreed to the DOJ's suggested divestiture remedies. 25 6 Even for
the general market, no studies are available examining the effect of
consolidation on pricing. Any analysis of the effect of the merger of
Spanish competitors on pricing should consider the context of the
252. Baker, supra note 250, at 212.
253. Id. at 215.
254. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
255. The average income of Hispanic households in the United States rose 15.9% be-
tween 1999 and 2001. David Kaplan, Spanish Language Networks Become Titans, Hispanic
American Center for Economic Research (2001), available at http://www.hacer.org/cur-
rent/Titans.php.
256. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 2.
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overall radio industry. This analysis should be correlated with data on
ownership to determine if stations commonly owned by a larger entity
have more market power regarding prices or price changes, taking
into account signal strength and audience. The pricing analysis
should also take into account the historical trend of paying less for
advertising formats serving minority audiences.
IH. Market Participation: Radio Formats, Multiple
Ownership, and Market Power to Reap Economies
of Scale Across Languages and Formats
A. DOJ Assumptions Regarding Format Change in the Radio
Marketplace
As part of its evaluation of whether a merger would have anti-
competitive effects, the DOJ must determine who participates in the
relevant market.25 7 This includes an analysis of the likelihood that
competition from new entrants will mitigate potential price rises
caused by the lessened competition from the merger. 258 This section
will analyze the likelihood that existing broadcasters will offer Spanish
programming. Under Brown Shoe, "unique production facilities" is one
factor in testing whether there is a separate submarket.259 Incumbent
broadcasters control FCC radio licenses and other facilities that en-
able them to change formats, undercutting the assertions that Spanish
and English-language radio compete in separate markets.
Joel Klein, acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Justice Department, spoke of the Department's analysis
of radio mergers in 1997, a year after the legislature passed the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. Klein said that in assessing whether a
merger would likely have anti-competitive effects in violation of the
Clayton Act, the DOJ considers the likelihood that other broadcasters
will change their formats to compete against increased prices result-
ing from a merger.260 Klein acknowledged that "format changes do
occur with some frequency in radio."261 However, he emphasized the
257. Kaiser Aluminum v. FlC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1981) (seller's production
flexibility relevant to product definition); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg.
41552, 41554, § 1.0 (Sept. 10, 1992) (never codified).
258. Id. at 41553, § 0.1.
259. 370 U.S. 294, 325.
260. Joel Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers, Address at the ANA Hotel 8-9 (Feb. 19, 1997), transcript
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1055.htm (last visited July 3, 2005).
261. Id. at 8.
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obstacles to changes in formats: there must be demand for an addi-
tional station, there would be promotional expenditures, and the sta-
tion would face losing revenue during the course of the change. 262
Klein said a station owner may change formats "if he's losing money
but he's not necessarily going to do it just because someone else is
making a little extra."2 63 The Bush Administration has adhered to the
policy of presuming that broadcasters would not change their formats
in its analysis of the Univision merger with HBC. 264
In December 1996, the DOJ approvedJacor's acquisition of Citi-
casters, one of the first mergers reviewed under the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996.265 In its Competitive Impact Statement, the DOJ
discussed Jacor's target audience of young adults aged eighteen to
thirty-four. DOJ expressed a concern that:
advertisers trying to reach young adults could efficiently reach this
audience on the radio without having to use a Jacor station. Post-
merger, however, many of these advertisers will be more depen-
dent on purchasing time from Jacor stations. Jacor could accord-
ingly raise its rates, and reduce the quality of its service to
advertisers targeting young adults (or who need either the Jacor
stations or WKRQ for other reasons) who would have scant alterna-
tives to paying the increase, while maintaining lower rates for other
advertisers. This would make a price increase profitable even
though some advertisers could switch to other radio stations. 266
The DOJ then considered whether other stations in the Cincinnati
market were likely to change their formats in response to price in-
creases. Foreshadowing Klein's speech, the DOJ concluded, "Most ra-
dio stations change format only when their existing formats are losing
money."267 They added, "A station is also unlikely to change its format
solely in response to higher prices being charged by a large estab-
lished company that controls a number of stations in the market, such
as Jacor."268
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 8-9.
265. See generally United States v. Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,671 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1996), 1996 WL 784589; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Justice Department RequiresJacor to Sell Cincinnati Radio Station, The Department's First
Radio Merger Challenge (Aug. 5, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
pressreleases/1996/369at.html (last visited July 3, 2005). Jacor was acquired by Clear
Channel in September 1999, see Press Release, Clear Channel Commc'n. Inc. & Jacor
Commc'ns Inc., Jacor: Merger Update (Feb. 11, 1999), available at http://www.cfonews.
com/jcor/c021099a.txt.
266. Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,671, at 78,738.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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In examining the Jacor merger, the DOJ's Competitive Impact
Statement did not consider the reverse scenario: in response to higher
prices being charged by a broadcaster, would a large or larger com-
pany, which may also be established and control several stations in the
market, change its format? For example, if a post-merger Univision
raised prices, would an even larger company such as Clear Channel
change the format of one of its existing stations to compete in Spanish
for those advertisers? Events subsequent to the closing of the Univi-
sion/HBC merger have shown the answer is yes! Other large broad-
casters have also changed some of their English formats to Spanish to
take advantage of those opportunities.269
Consistent with Klein's speech and the Jacor precedent, the DOJ
has concluded in other radio merger cases that entry of competitors is
unlikely to counteract potential post-merger price increases. For ex-
ample, in the merger of Clear Channel and AM/FM, the DOJ con-
cluded that other stations
are unlikely to change their formats and are unlikely to attract
those audiences in sufficiently large numbers to defeat a price in-
crease by the merged Clear Channel/AMFM stations . . . because
they would likely lose their existing audiences ... [and] would still
be unlikely to attract enough listeners to provide suitable alterna-
tive to the merged entity. 2 7 0
Similar words have been recited in other DOJ challenges to radio
mergers. 271
While it may have seemed unlikely in the year after the Telecom-
munications Act that reformatting would occur in response to price
changes, the DOJ should examine whether that presumption is cor-
rect. The DOJ's assumption that a station owner would only reformat
if the station were losing money seems questionable. For example,
Clear Channel-owned KSJO in San Jose, California broadcasted in an
English Rock format for thirty-six years; in October 2004, the com-
269. See infra Part LV.B (regarding Infinity and ABC Radio Network's entry into Spanish
broadcasting).
270. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 6, United States v. Clear
Channel, AMFM Inc. (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2000). available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f6300/6329.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
271. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief Against Combination in Violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act at 6, 23, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Infinity Broad. Corp.,
1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,749 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1997); Complaint for Injunctive Relief
Against Combination in Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act at 5 21, United States v.
EZ Commc's, Inc. & Evergreen Media Corp., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,841 (D.D.C.
June 27, 1997).
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pany changed its format from English to Spanish. 272 As an English
Rock station, it was ranked 8th in the San Jose market in 2002, but
22nd by the summer of 2004.273 It had a loyal following and was likely
not losing money. Nevertheless, Clear Channel apparently believed it
could make more money by changing its format to Spanish. In Sep-
tember 2005, Clear Channel reported a 130% increase in audience
share after it converted the format of KSJO to Spanish-language.274
Hispanic Business magazine reported that Clear Channel's strategy
is to "grow its Spanish-language presence by converting stations, not
buying new ones."27 5 "We have plenty of radio stations," said Alfredo
Alonso, a fifteen-year veteran of Spanish-language radio who heads
Clear Channel's Hispanic programming.27 6 "We have a lot of radio
properties under-performing," Alonso added.277
The FCC concluded that between the years 2000-2003 approxi-
mately 163 stations switched from an exclusive English-language for-
mat to Spanish, and seventy-seven stations switched from an exclusive
Spanish-language format to English.2 78 The number of Spanish-lan-
guage radio stations large enough to be rated by Arbitron increased
from 533 in 1998 to 678 in 2004.279 SBS claimed that Spanish-lan-
guage broadcast incumbents, rather than new entrants, accomplished
most of the format conversions.2 80 That proportion, however, has
likely changed with the entry of Clear Channel, Infinity, and ABC Ra-
dio Networks into Spanish and bilingual formats. In its review of the
merger, the FCC concluded that the need to change formats to pro-
vide programming in Spanish does not preclude entry of new Spanish-
language radio stations. 28 1
272. Brad Kava, Oldest S.J Rock Station Goes to Spanish Format, KSJO-FM Move Reflects Mar-
ket Shift, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 29, 2004, at Al.
273. Jessica Yadegaran, Call Sign KSJO Rides Its Stairway to Heaven, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2004, at Al.
274. Press Release, Clear Channel Radio, Clear Channel Radio's Multi-Market Spanish-
Language Programming Initiative Attracting Greater Share of Radio Listeners in 2005
(Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/PressReleases/2005/
091405CCR-Spanish.pdf [hereinafter Clear Channel Press Release].
275. Brass, supra note 23, at 2.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18857 (2003).
279. Arbitron reported over 750 Spanish-language stations in the United States in
2004; 678 of them had large enough audiences in geographical areas Arbitron measures to
be included in Arbitron's database. ARBITRON, supra note 119, at 2-3.
280. Willkie Farr Letter, supra note 81.
281. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. at
18870
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Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, many more radio
companies have conducted initial public offerings of their stock in-
cluding Entravision, Radio One, and Citidel.282 It would be informa-
tive to examine whether publicly traded companies are more likely to
change formats than privately held companies. Although there are
well-financed private radio companies, public companies may have
more capital to acquire new programming and talent, promote format
changes, and withstand any shift in revenue base. Public companies
also have more pressure to show revenue growth for a station on a
yearly basis.
The existence of many more large radio and media companies
has changed the competitive landscape. A company that owns one
Spanish-language station in a market may find itself competing not
just with other single-station owners, but with a Clear Channel, as well
as Univision, in both Spanish and English programming. Clear Chan-
nel owns the maximum number of stations permitted by the FCC in
several major markets, including Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Den-
ver.283 Large, consolidated entities have the resources to change for-
mats based on the fact that "someone else is making a little extra."284
The practice of format changes between languages indicates a
greater proclivity toward market participation across languages than
the DOJ assumed. This "[c] ross-elasticity of supply, or production flex-
ibility among sellers, is another relevant factor to be considered in
defining a product market for antitrust purposes."285
Establishing the relevant market is an essential element in the
Government's case.28 6 An antitrust plaintiff bears the burden at the
pleading stage to define the relevant market:
Where [an antitrust] plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant
market with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability
and cross-elasticity of demand, or alleges a proposed relevant mar-
ket that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable substitute
products even when all factual inferences are granted in plaintiffs
282. Radio One Files Plans for IPO, WASH. Bus. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at http://www.bizjour-
nals.com/washington/stories/1990/03/15/dailyl.html; Company Overview, Entravision
Commc'n Corp., http://premium.hoovers.com/global/msn/factsheet.xhtml?COID=
100798 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); MSN Money, IPO Center, IPO View by Name, http://
moneycentral.hoovers.com/global/msn/index.xhtml?pageid=1949&Index=C (last visited
Jan.16, 2006).
283. See Clear Channel Commc'ns, Radio Station Search, http://www.clearchannel.
com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx (search for "Los Angeles," "Denver," and "Cincinnati")
(last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
284. Klein, supra note 260, at 8.
285. Kaiser Aluminum v. FTrC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1981).
286. See United States v. Engelhard, 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997).
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favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient and a motion to
dismiss may be granted."28
7
Even if the government were to provide sufficient evidence to show
that for at least some advertisers, English and Spanish-language radio
are not appropriate substitutes, they must still show that substitute
products would not be produced by other broadcasters. In other
words, the government must submit facts showing that other broad-
casters would not supply programming in Spanish. 288
Further research should be conducted to determine whether
competitors, large, medium, or small, have indeed changed their for-
mats in the wake of mergers.28 9 This analysis is particularly important
for the market the DOJ has defined as "Spanish," where the assump-
tion of no new entrants reinforces the small market size perception
that leads to higher projected concentration levels and the likelihood
of antitrust remedies.
B. Analyzing Market Entry into Spanish Formats
A key assumption in the DOJ's analysis of the Univision/HBC
merger was that competition from new entrants was unlikely.2 90 This
assumption may have some merit for entities that do not currently
own a radio station in a given market. The DOJ concluded that "[n] ew
radio spectrum acquisition is highly unlikely, however, because spec-
287. Adidas Am. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing Queen City
Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1997)). For a motion to
dismiss, "the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant
is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198
(2d Cir. 2001) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). Market definition is a
deeply fact-intensive inquiry, leading courts to hesitate to grant a motion to dismiss for
failure to allege a product market. Id. at 200. However, a motion to dismiss an antitrust
case on those grounds may be granted where warranted. Id. (citing Queen City Pizza, 124
F.3d at 436).
288. "Defining a relevant product market is primarily a process of describing those
groups of producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the ability-
actual or potential-to take significant amounts of business away from each other." Engel-
hard, 126 F.3d at 1305 (citing United States Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d
986, 995 (lth Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted)).
289. Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence from
Radio Broadcasting, Q.J. ECON. 1009, 1009-25 (2001), analyzed data on the number of pro-
gramming formats relative to the number of stations in the wake of the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act. They found that station ownership concentration increases product variety,
as evidenced by data that many commonly owned stations program in similar, but not
identical formats. Id. at 1010, 1023-24. A similar analysis of whether competitors change
formats in the wake of other consolidations in the market would be instructive for both
antitrust analysis and examining the public interest implications of consolidation.
290. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 8.
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trum is a scarce and expensive commodity. .... ,291With an FM radio
station in a large market potentially costing $150 million or more,
purchasing a station is a significant entry barrier, in addition to pro-
gramming, personnel, and marketing costs. 292
Nevertheless, the entry barriers are significantly lower for entities
which already own one or more stations in the relevant market. In the
Univision/HBC merger, the DOJ assumed that English-language
broadcasters would not spend the money and assume the risks to
change their formats.293 The DOJ posited that "[r]adio stations are
unlikely to undertake a format change solely in response to small but
significant increases in price," and that "radio stations that did change
formats would be unlikely to attract enough listeners to provide suffi-
cient alternatives to the merged entity."294 The DOJ emphasized that
"[r] eformatting is an expensive endeavor that involves the loss of the
station's existing audience, a significant expense to attract new listen-
ers, and no assurance of attracting a significant listening base tojustify
the costs involved."295 The DOJ asserted reformatting occurs only
"when a station believes that a particular format is not being suffi-
ciently served or when a station finds a niche between existing for-
mats."296 No additional evidence or analysis was cited to support the
DOJ's assumptions.
The DOJ's assumption of no format changes overlooks the mar-
ket power of broadcasters who own multiple stations. Clear Channel
has led the way in bringing the economies of scale acquired in the
larger English market into the alleged Spanish market. Infinity, ABC
Networks, and other traditionally English broadcasters followed this
trend. The consequence of defining the market by language is a com-
petitive advantage for English incumbents who can amortize their
costs across formats and languages and use the breadth of their for-
mats to attract audiences and advertisers. This movement between lan-
guage formats also highlights the inability of even large Spanish-
language broadcasters to exclude English-based broadcasters from
Spanish programming, an important measure of market power, or the
lack thereof.
291. Id.
292. Brass, supra note 23, at 3-4.
293. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 33, at 8.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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Shortly after the FCC approved the Univision/HBC merger, ex-
actly what the DOJ presumed would not occur happened; with Clear
Channel's launch of its Hispanic Division, seemingly overnight the
company became the third largest provider of Spanish-language radio
in the United States, measured by the number of stations, exceeded
only by Univision and Entravision. 297 Depending on which stations
they choose to convert to Spanish programming, Clear Channel could
become larger than Entravision or Univision in terms of signal
strength, audience, and revenues from Spanish and related formats.
In September 2005, Clear Channel announced that less than a year
since its launch, "Clear Channel's Spanish-language programming ini-
tiative is a proven hit," boosting ratings in many markets. 298 Yet, Clear
Channel's potential to compete with Univision was never considered.
No longer constrained by its investment in HBC, Clear Channel
launched headlong into the Spanish market, quickly becoming a for-
midable player. In San Jose, California, the new Clear Channel Span-
ish station vaulted from low ratings in 2004 as an English Rock station
to the number two-ranked station in the entire market in the Spring
of 2005, far outpacing Univision's Regional Mexican station and
eleven other English formats.2 99 Clear Channel's success in converting
to Spanish demonstrates the flaws in the DOJ's no-entry model.
It is noteworthy that Clear Channel pursued this strategy after the
approval of the Univision/HBC merger. Clear Channel owned 26% of
HBC, valued at $3 billion, before HBC merged with Univision. 300
Clear Channel's equity interest prior to the merger was below 33%, so
Clear Channel's stations were not considered in the FCC's analysis of
the merger as Clear Channel's interest were "not attributable" under
the FCC's standards. 30 1 Neither did the DOJ consider Clear Channel's
potential to compete against the merger parties.
297. Katy Bachman, CC to Flip 25 of its Radio Stations to Spanish Format, MEDMAA T SEK, Sept.
16, 2004, available at http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/search/article-display.jsp?vnucon-
tentid=1000631071.
298. Clear Channel Press Release, supra note 274.
299. Radio & Records, Ratings, Spring 2005: San Jose, available at http://www.radioand
records.com (follow "Ratings" hyperlink; then follow "San Jose" hyperlink) (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005) (results fromJuly 21, 2005 on file with the author) (data based on Arbitron's
reported ratings, used with permission of Arbitron). The latest ratings reported by Radio &
Records are available at Radio & Records, Ratings, http://radioandrecords.com (follow
"Ratings" hyperlink).
300. Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R.
18834, 18836 (2003).
301. See Press Release, FCC, Commission Amends Broadcast and Cable/MDS Owner-
ship Attribution Rules (MM Docket Nos. 94-150, 92-51, and 87-154) (Aug. 5, 1999), availa-
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Other large, primarily English-language broadcasters also
changed some stations to Spanish-language formats in 2005. ABC Ra-
dio Network struck a five-year deal with SBS to syndicate three of its
popular Spanish radio shows. 30 2 As part of the deal, ABC has the ex-
clusive rights to sell national advertisements on three of SBS' stations,
as well as on SBS's WLEY-FM in Chicago and KRZZ-FM in San Fran-
cisco. 303 Adweek, an advertising trade publication, reported that "while
the Hispanic market may be booming, there is a shortage of syndi-
cated Hispanic programming. ' '30 4 In an irony of making money by
helping your competitors, Adweek noted that "ABC and SBS can now
offer syndicated Hispanic programming to groups wishing to expand
into Hispanic radio such as Clear Channel .... ,305 In 2005, Entravi-
sion joined the ABC Radio Network program syndication. 30 6
SBS and Viacom's Infinity Broadcasting announced a strategic al-
liance in December 2004.307 At that time, Infinity controlled 185 radio
stations, while its parent company, Viacom, controlled numerous
broadcast television, cable, radio, outdoor, and on-line properties. 30 8
Through their deal, Viacom/Infinity traded an FM radio station with
a powerful signal in the San Francisco area for 10% of SBS's equity
and an opportunity to acquire another 5% of SBS' stock.30 9 The two
companies agreed to "work together to more effectively market their
respective properties" and to "work towards increasing both compa-
nies' national and regional advertising revenue." 310 In January 2005,
Infinity began Spanish-language radio programming in Fresno, Cali-
ble at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/NewsReleases/1999/nrmm9O2O.html (last
visited July 26, 2005).
302. Katy Bachman, ABC Radio, Spanish Broadcasting Strike Deal, ADWEEK, Nov. 10, 2004,
available at http://www.adweek.com/aw/search/article-display.jsp?vnu-contentid=
1000717039 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Press Release, Entravison, Entravision Radio to Carry Top-Rated Morning Show
'El Cucuy de la Manafia' on its Radio Tricolor Network (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://
corporate.entravision.com/ccbnTemplate.cfm?ticker=-EVC&script=410&layout=-6&item_
id--671048 (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
307. Press Release, Spanish Broad. Sys. (SBS), Spanish Broadcasting System and
Viacom Complete Strategic Alliance-San Francisco Radio Transaction Consummated
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/12-30-04.pdf.
308. Press Release, Viacom and Spanish Broadcasting System Announce Strategic Alli-
ance, Broad-based Partnership Will Target Growing Hispanic Audience (Oct. 5 2004),
available at http://www.viacom.com/view-release.jhtml?inD=5000002&inReleaseID=
26157 (last visited July 10, 2005).
309. Id.
310. Id.
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fornia and Washington, D.C.3 11 In the same month, Infinity converted
one of its stations that had broadcast in a Rock format for twenty years
in English in Washington, D.C. to Spanish.3 1 2
In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours,313 the Supreme Court
stressed that "monopoly power is the power to control prices or ex-
clude competition. ' 314 In that case, the Court questioned the market
definition proposed by the government and noted that du Pont did
not possess the ability to exclude competitors even in the narrowly
defined market for cellophane packing, let alone the broader market
for flexible packaging.31 5 The pre and post-merger format changes
between languages indicate that Univision and other Spanish broad-
casters lack the ability to exclude English broadcasters from direct
competition in Spanish.
A merger must be proscribed where there is "a reasonable
probability that the merger will substantially lessen competition. '316
"The predictive judgment often required under § 7 [of the Clayton
Act] involves a decision based upon a careful scrutiny and a reasona-
ble assessment of the future consequences of a merger .... "317 This
Article argues that assuming other broadcasters will not change their
formats to compete in Spanish does not satisfy the level of scrutiny
and assessment of competition the law requires.
The pattern of format and language shifts are not merely "postac-
quisition evidence tending to diminish the probability or impact of
anticompetitive effects" whose probative value is limited.3 18 This pat-
tern demonstrates a far greater willingness by the industry to change
formats than the DOJ presumed. In General Dynamics, the Supreme
Court stressed that while market shares were "the primary index of
market power," only a further examination of the particular market-
311. Paul Heine, Q&A with Infinity President of Programming Rob Barnett, BILLBOARD RA-
DIO MONITOR, Apr. 5, 2005, at 2, available at http://billboardradiomonitor.com/radiomon-
itor/search/article-display.jsp?schema=&vnu contentid=1000866400 (last visited July 10,
2005).
312. Brain Teitelman, Infinity Flips WHFS to Spanish, BILLBOARD RADIO MONITOR, Jan.
12, 2005, available at http://billboardradiomonitor.com/radiomonitor/news/format/
rock/article-display.jsp.;vnu-contentid=1000751157 (last visited July 10, 2005).
313. 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1955).
314. Id. Although du Pont was brought under the Sherman Act, its definition of mono-
poly power is relevant for the Clayton Act analysis of whether there is sufficient competi-
tion or potential market entry to counter the possibility that a merger would substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
315. Id. at 404.
316. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
317. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 556 (1973).
318. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 504 (1974).
ANTITRUST
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
its structure, history, and probable future-can provide the appropri-
ate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the
merger.3 19 Under that standard, the dynamic nature of entry and exit
into radio formats in various languages should be considered in deter-
mining whether a market is unduly concentrated. These format modi-
fications demonstrate that changes between languages are part of
radio's competitive paradigm and challenge the notion that Spanish
and English radio compete in separate, insulated markets.
C. Assessing the Likelihood of New Competitors from Committed
or Uncommitted Entrants
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define firms that "likely would
enter rapidly into production or sale of a market product in the mar-
ket's area, without incurring significant sunk costs of entry and exit"
as "uncommitted entrants. '" 320 For uncommitted entrants to be
counted in the relevant market, they must likely "supply" the market
"within one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs
of entry and exit, in response to a 'small but significant and nontran-
sitory' price increase." 321 Sunk costs are defined as the "acquisition
costs of tangible and intangible assets that cannot be recovered
through the redeployment of these assets outside the relevant mar-
ket," i.e., costs uniquely incurred to supply the relevant product and
geographic market.322 Examples include "market-specific investments
in production facilities, technologies, marketing (including product
acceptance), research and development, regulatory approvals, and
testing."323 The Guidelines provide that "[u] ncommitted entrants are
capable of making such quick and uncommitted supply responses that
they likely influenced the market premerger, would influence it post-
merger, and accordingly are considered as market participants at both
times."324
The supply response of such firms would create "new production
or sale in the relevant market," which "could be quickly terminated
without significant loss."325 The Guidelines explain that "[e]ntrants
that must commit substantial sunk costs are regarded as 'committed'
319. Id. at 498.
320. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41554, § 1.0 (Sept. 10,
1992) (never codified).
321. Id. at 41556, § 1.32.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 41554, § 1.0.
325. Id.
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entrants because those sunk costs make entry irreversible in the short
term without foregoing that investment; thus the likelihood of their
entry must be evaluated with regard to their long-term
profitability." 326
The DOJ employs a three-step methodology to assess whether a
committed entry, involving significant sunk costs of entry and exit, de-
ters or counteracts the competitive effects of a merger.32 7 The first
step assesses whether entry can achieve significant market impact
within a "timely period."3 28 The second assesses whether committed
entry would be profitable for long-term participation in the market.
The third step evaluates whether timely and likely entry would be suf-
ficient to return market prices to their pre-merger levels. 329 Entry is
determined likely if it would be profitable at pre-merger prices, and if
the entrant could secure such prices. 330
In changing to a Spanish format, marketing and product accept-
ance constitute the most significant costs, but may not be much
greater than the costs of launching a new English format. Stations
often launch large marketing campaigns when changing formats,
sometimes foregoing commercials for a period of time to attract audi-
ence.331 While there are some costs associated with marketing the for-
mat, they may be worthwhile if more listeners and thus advertisers are
attracted. 33 2 An incumbent broadcasters' sales force already knows
326. Id. at 41554, § 1.0 n.7.
327. Id. at 41561, § 3.0.
328. Id. For committed entrants a "timely period" is within two years from initial plan-
ning to significant market impact. Id. at 41561-62, § 3.2. Supply responses that require less
than one year and insignificant sunk costs are analyzed under uncommitted entry. Id. at
41554, § 3.0 n.25.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 41562, § 3.3. The entrant's ability to capture a share of reasonably expected
growth in market demand and to divert sales from incumbents, through vertical integra-
tion for example, is considered. Id. Thus, the market analysis should consider whether the
submarket is growing, as well as whether potential entrants have vertical resources (concert
venues, billboards, etc.), all of which Clear Channel has. See Clear Channel Commc'ns,
Inc., Corporate History, http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/company-history.aspx
(last visited Aug. 2, 2005). The market entry analysis should also take into account the
entrant's ability to use its horizontal resources, other stations in the same market or other
markets, to do "package sales" of various formats.
331. Clear Channel Goes Indie?, http://www.waxy.org/archive/2003/12/30/clearch.
shtml (Dec. 30, 2003) (posting to weblog noting that Clear Channel's KDL switched from
dance to rock format and had no DJs or commercials for the first two weeks of the new
format).
332. The Guidelines require consideration of the costs of substitution relative to the
profitability of sales at the elevated price, and whether the firm's capacity is profitably
employed elsewhere. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41557, § 1.321.
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how to sell radio advertisements and could be educated about the
Spanish-speaking, and Hispanic communities and the companies that
target them. There are many advertising agencies and firms that could
help in this effort.
For firms that do not control FCC licenses in the relevant geo-
graphic market, sunk costs in acquiring a station license are signifi-
cant. However, for existing competitors who already have FCC radio
licenses, sunk costs to change formats between languages are much
smaller.
When switching formats, the change is not technological. It re-
quires no additional investment in plant or equipment. The most im-
portant piece of "equipment" is the FCC-issued license to broadcast
on that frequency. With a broadcast antenna to transmit the station's
signal, a location for the antenna, and a broadcast booth to control
signals, a radio station can broadcast whatever content it chooses
within the FCC's boundaries of decency. No regulatory approvals are
required to change formats.
If a broadcaster already has a Spanish format in another market,
its costs may be significantly reduced; it can use that content and ex-
isting marketing knowledge in the new market. Programming can be
produced in a centralized location and distributed to stations via satel-
lite or data streaming. Programs can be "localized" using local DJs or
station personnel to announce the local time, weather, and local in-
formation. Broadcasters could also use their existing studios to pro-
duce a new Spanish format. Alternatively, they can buy syndicated
Spanish programming, just as they could buy syndicated English
programming.
While long-time Spanish operators have some advantage from
their built-up audience, contacts, and market knowledge, English op-
erators may gain a foothold in the market if they have the commit-
ment and resources. Clear Channel clearly had both. Clear Channel
would have learned a great deal about Spanish formats through its
service on HBC's Board of Directors. Clear Channel also faced compe-
tition from Spanish-language stations in its markets, giving it another
vantage to assess the market potential.
Clear Channel has demonstrated its ability to provide Spanish
formats on a "timely basis." It did so within a year of the Univision/
HBC merger, and its conversions continued apace through 2005.
With its vast inventory of stations, some of which are underperform-
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ing, 333 Clear Channel could turn a format to Spanish-language quickly
if it determined it should do so.
There is substantial evidence that Clear Channel satisfies the test
for a committed entrant into the Spanish format. As a committed en-
trant it must commit substantial sunk costs. Clear Channel has already
sunk costs into the FCC license and station equipment, regardless of
format. It has substantial personnel, some of whom, like the billing
department, can be used to serve Spanish formats without significant
retraining. It has already committed the resources to retrain market-
ing staff to sell advertisements for Spanish programming, to the ex-
tent such training may be necessary. It also has Spanish formats, which
they can distribute via satellite or the internet to other markets with-
out incurring additional production or personnel costs.
At a minimum, Clear Channel meets the uncommitted entrant
test. It is capable of supplying Spanish radio without significant addi-
tional sunk costs beyond what it has already invested. Through its in-
ventory of stations, personnel, formats, and capital, Clear Channel can
quickly deploy to compete in other markets.
As an investor in HBC, Clear Channel arguably influenced the
market before the Univision/HBC merger, another factor used to
identify uncommitted entrants under the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines.33 4 It also influenced the market by competing against Spanish
stations with its English formats that attracted Hispanic listeners.
With their success in entering the Spanish and Spanish-hybrid
formats, the likelihood that Clear Channel, Infinity, or ABC Radio
Networks will enter a market in Spanish must be considered in analyz-
ing future mergers. That analysis should include not only existing
Spanish broadcasters, but recognize the potential for Clear Channel,
Infinity, and others to convert more stations to Spanish if they found
it lucrative to do so. Increased advertising prices in the wake of a
merger might also attract other multi-station conglomerates, such as
Radio One or Citidel, to change some of their stations to Spanish.
In United States v. Engelhard Corp.,335 the Eleventh Circuit com-
mented, "Defining a relevant product market is primarily a process of
describing those groups of producers which, because of the similarity
of their products, have the ability-actual or potential-to take signifi-
cant amounts of business away from each other."336 The ability of En-
333. Brass, supra note 23, at 2.
334. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41554, § 1.0.
335. 126 F.3d 1302 (1lth Cir. 1997).
336. Id. at 1305.
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glish-based broadcasters to shift to Spanish formats challenges both
the DOJ assumption of no market participation by other broadcasters,
and the market definition itself.
In February 2004, the Justice Department held a workshop on
merger enforcement to solicit comments on a variety of issues, includ-
ing how to incorporate a dynamic competitive analysis, recognizing
that a merger may have different effects at different times. 337 It sought
comments on how to treat uncommitted entrants, noting that the
merger guidelines "do not discuss the role of uncommitted entrants
in the evaluation of competitive effects nor do they indicate how one
assigns shares to uncommitted entrants."338 No revisions have since
been announced to the merger guidelines. The issues raised in this
Article illustrate the importance of incorporating a dynamic analysis
of market participants that takes into account past and likely future
market behavior, rather than presuming the likelihood of no entry.
Meanwhile, those who broadcast exclusively in Spanish in a par-
ticular geographic market face more constraints to consolidation be-
cause of the narrow definition of the so called "Spanish market." For
all but the smallest Spanish broadcasters to grow, they may be forced
to acquire assets in English formats. This situation occurs because the
acquisition of Spanish-formatted stations by small and even mid-sized
Spanish broadcasters may raise concentration levels in the small
"Spanish market" as currently defined. Such growth, however, comes
at a higher cost, further skewing the competitive imbalance between
English and Spanish broadcasters.
English-formatted stations, especially those that do not target mi-
norities, generally cost more to purchase than Spanish or other sta-
tions which target minorities. This stems from the advertising industry
practice of paying less to advertise to racial and ethnic minority audi-
ences than to majority audiences, contributing to lower revenues for
Spanish and other minority serving stations.33 9 Generally, radio sta-
tions are sold based on a formula that multiplies the cash flow made
by the station's operation by an agreed upon number, or cash flow
337. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department/Federal Trade Commis-
sion to HostJoint Workshop on Merger Enforcement (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2004/202426.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006);
U.S. Dep't. of Justice/Antitrust, Announcement of a Workshop on Merger Enforcement,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201896.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
338. U.S. Dep't. of Justice/Antitrust, supra note 337, at 3.
339. OFoRI, supra note 70, at 22; Napoli, supra note 5, at 177.
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multiple.340 Higher revenues for stations whose audiences are largely
non-minority contribute to those stations being more expensive than
stations that garner predominantly minority audiences.
This imbedded bias has significant repercussions for those aspir-
ing to build their asset base in order to compete. Advertising pricing
practices, coupled with higher acquisition costs resulting from the
market definition, make it more difficult for Spanish-based broadcast-
ers to compete and reduce revenues available for programming. 41
The market definition may also limit the value of Spanish-language
stations by decreasing the number of companies with which they
could merge.
English broadcasters' entry into Spanish formats contradicts the
assertion that the markets are separate. It also reveals the ways in
which defining the market by language creates market distortions that
shift the competitive balance in favor of broadcasters with a substan-
tial base in English formats, a large market with many providers. The
market definition may also deter firms with a substantial base in Span-
ish broadcasting from offering more Spanish programming because
of the potential constraints on expansion in that smaller market. The
lack of "unique production facilities" for Spanish and English broad-
casters indicates the Brown Shoe test 342 is not met in this case.
IV. Market Concentration as Distinguished from Market
Power-Antitrust Considerations Arising from the
History and Structure of Radio Programming
for Minority Audiences
In General Dynamics,343 the Supreme Court cautioned that to de-
termine whether a market was unduly concentrated under the Brown
Shoe analysis, "statistics concerning market share and concentration,
340. See Reed Bunzel, Frank Boyle: Perfectly Frank, RADIO INK, May 12, 2003, available at
http://www.radioink.com/listingsEntry.asp?ID=108260&PT=industryqa (last visited Aug.
27, 2005).
341. Commenting on the impact of "minority discounts," the practice of paying Span-
ish and minority-oriented formats less for their advertisements, Tom Castro, then Chair-
man and President of El Dorado Communications said:
Because of the discounts . . . [o]ur profits are less . . . when it comes time to
buying a station and we're competing with CBS and Clear Channel and ABC,
they're going to outbid us for those properties because of the profits that they
have built up over time .... The quality of programming, while good, would be
better if we had more profits . . . we could invest that back into our business.
OFORI, supra note 70, at 21.
342. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
343. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 504 (1974).
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while of great significance, were not conclusive indicators of anticom-
petitive effects... a merger had to be functionally viewed, in context
of its particular industry . . . [including] its structure, history, and
probable future. ' 344 The DOJ approaches merger analysis in stages:
first defining the relevant market, second examining whether other
competitors are likely to participate in that market, third analyzing
concentration in the market as defined. Under General Dynamics and
Brown Shoe, concentration numbers must be analyzed in the context of
the dynamics that shape that market and the incentives to participate
in it. This Section will discuss the factors relevant to such an analysis.
In merger cases, once the market is defined and the participants
are determined, the DOJ applies the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to
analyze whether the proposed merger would produce undue market
concentration.3 45 Where the HHI indicates that the market is already
highly concentrated, at 1800 or above on the HHI scale, changes of
more than 100 points are presumed to have adverse competitive con-
sequences by creating or enhancing market power.346 The parties can
however supply evidence to rebut this presumption through
evidence. 34 7
The DOJ reported that applying the HHI to the markets in which
both Hispanic Broadcasting and Entravision operated radio stations
yielded post-acquisition HHIs (assuming an effective combination of
Entravision's and HBC's market shares) of 5500 to 9200 points.3 48 In
its complaint, the DOJ noted that this is "well above the 1800 thresh-
old at which the Department [ofJustice] normally considers a market
to be highly concentrated."3 49
In General Dynamics, the Supreme Court cautioned that past mar-
ket share is not a definitive predictor of future ability to dominate a
market, especially for a small market. The Court commented:
Evidence of past production does not... necessarily give a proper
picture of a company's future ability to compete .... [C] ompanies
that have controlled sufficiently large shares of a concentrated
market are barred from merger by §7 [of the Clayton Act], not
because of their past acts, but because their past performances im-
ply an ability to continue to dominate with at least equal vigor ....
344. Id. at 498 (citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 333 n.38).
345. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41557-58, § 1.5 (Sept.
10, 1992) (never codified).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 7, 21.
349. Id.
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Evidence of ... annual sales is relevant as a prediction of future
competitive strength. 350
The HHI levels the DOJ calculated assumed other broadcasters would
not change formats to compete with the merged entity. This assump-
tion means that in an already small and concentrated market, consoli-
dation would only increase concentration levels. That conclusion rests
on the unsupported assumption that market entry will not occur, as
well as on the belief that Spanish and English broadcasting are sepa-
rate markets.
The characteristics of the HHI analysis contribute to the high
concentration numbers in the Univision/HBC merger analysis. The
HHI can be radically altered by the market definition, which is often a
major point of contention in antitrust analysis.35 1 Defining the market
as Spanish-language only, as opposed to Hispanic serving stations or
analyzing the whole market, makes the HHI level much larger for
Spanish-language stations because of the relatively small size of the
Spanish-only market, the small number of players, as well as the distri-
bution of market share.
A mathematical result of the HHI is that it "gives proportionately
greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms, in accord with
their relative importance in competitive interactions" within the de-
fined market.35 2 It also yields higher HHI concentration levels in mar-
kets with a small number of participants. 353 For example, in a market
of ten competitors, each with 10% share, the HHI is 1000. In a market
of five competitors, each with 20% share, the HHI is 2000.
In United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.,354 the D.C. Circuit com-
mented that concentration is not surprising where "a product is eso-
teric and its market small."355 Only four firms in the United States
sold the product at issue in Baker Hughes.356 The trial judge found that
"[c]oncentration has existed for some time [in the relevant product
market] but there is no proof of overpricing, excessive profit or any
decline in quality, service or diminishing innovation."357 In many local
radio markets, four or fewer companies providing Spanish program-
350. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974).
351. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that
the outcome "hinges on the proper market definition").
352. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41557-58, § 1.5.
353. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at app. A (definition of HHI).
354. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
355. Id. at 986.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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ming have high enough ratings to meet Arbitron's minimum report-
ing standards, while a few markets draw more participants who
achieve enough market share to be reported. 358 The DOJ presented
no evidence of overpricing or excessive profit by Univision or other
Spanish-format broadcasters. The advertising industry pricing prac-
tices that result in lower advertising rates and revenues for stations
with minority audiences indicate that the opposite is true, that their
profits are lower than those who serve majority audiences. 359
The HHI is indifferent as to why there are fewer competitors in
the market. Steven Wildman's and Theomary Karamanis's theories re-
garding the "undersupply" of programming targeted at minorities
sheds light on the factors affecting participation and concentration in
media markets serving minorities.3 60 Their paper, ECONOMICS OF MI-
NORITY PROGRAMMING, 3 6 ' analyzed whether the United States televi-
sion industry undersupplied programming that would be beneficial to
minority populations. They based their analysis on an economic
model that shows that large blocks of viewers with similar tastes exert
inordinate influence on program supply and make it more profitable
for broadcasters and advertisers to serve the large block than an iden-
tifiable minority block.3 62 Until the number of outlets or the size of
the minority block increases, a broadcaster will find it more profitable
to show programs targeted at the majority than to broadcast to the
minority.363 For example, in a hypothetical market with eight broad-
casters and 100 television viewers, twelve of whom are a distinct minor-
ity sharing similar tastes within the group, and assuming that
minorities will watch majority-oriented programming instead of turn-
358. In August 2005, in the San Jose, California radio market, whose population was
21.8% Hispanic, four Spanish format broadcasters were reported in Arbitron's ratings. Ra-
dio & Records, supra note 299. In July 2005, three Spanish format broadcasters were re-
ported in Arbitron's ratings in Sacramento, California, whose radio market was 12.9%
Hispanic. Id. (follow "Ratings" hyperlink; then follow "Sacramento" hyperlink) (results
from Sept. 14, 2005 on file with the author). As of September 2005, in Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin, where 5.9% of the radio market was Hispanic, one station offering Spanish program-
ming was reported in Arbitron's ratings. Id. (follow "Ratings" hyperlink; then follow
"Milwaukee" hyperlink) (Dec. 19, 2005 results on file with the author). As of August 2005,
the Los Angeles, California radio market was 37.5% Hispanic, with seven companies re-
ported in Arbitron's ratings broadcasting in Spanish formats. Id. (follow "Ratings" hyper-
link; then follow "Los Angeles" hyperlink) (Sept. 14, 2005 results on file with the author).
Arbitron information cited by Radio & Records used with permission of Arbitron.
359. See OFORI, supra note 70, at 8; Napoli, supra note 5, at 177.
360. WILDMAN & KARAMANIS, supra note 5.
361. Id.
362. Id. (citing Peter Steiner).
363. Id.
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ing off the television, broadcasters will find it more profitable to pro-
vide programming targeted at the majority "because one-eighth of 100
viewers is greater than 12."364
This economic theory postulates that minorities are underserved
with programming in large part because they are numerical minori-
ties. If the minority population also has a lower average income than
the majority population, this tendency to under-target the minority
will increase.3 65 However, even minority groups with higher incomes
may not attract much programming targeted at them. Asian-Ameri-
cans have higher median incomes than all other American ethnic
groups including Whites.3 66 Yet, few stations offer programming in
Asian languages.3 67
Attitudes toward a racial or ethnic minority may exacerbate this
tendency not to target their needs. If the owners of the broadcast out-
let prefer to serve the majority, they may do so, regardless of the size
of the minority group. The historical dearth of minority-targeted pro-
gramming has led entrepreneurs, whether members of minority
groups or not, to provide programming targeted at the minority. Pe-
ter Siegelman and Joel Waldfogel concluded that minority ownership
increases the net amount of minority-targeted programming. 368 One
explanation they proffer is that "even though white owners commonly
provide black-targeted programming, black owners enter in situations
that white owners avoid. 369
An FCC commissioned study by the Ivy Group concluded that
"[m] inority licensees especially felt their commitment to their respec-
tive communities-to keep them informed, to empower them, to re-
port on current events from the perspective of those whom the events
would most impact."37 0 However, some efforts to provide such pro-
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 3-4 (2003), available at.
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2005).
367. In 2005, thirty-six radio stations in the United States reportedly had "Asian" for-
mats. See Radio-Locator, Radio Station Finder (Format: Asian), http://www.radio-locator.
com/cgi-bin/finder?format=asn&s=R&sr=Y (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) ("formerly the MIT
List of Radio Stations on the Internet").
368. Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externalities, Minority
Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, in 10 ADVANCES IN APPLIED
MICROECONOMICS. 25 (2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/roundtable-
docs/waldfogel-c.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).
369. Id. at 22-23. Without profit data, they could not demonstrate whether this was due
to information advantages, ideological, or social commitments. Id.
370. Iw PLANNING GROUP, supra note 21, at 82.
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gramming have met resistance. The Ivy Group study documented the
story of African-American broadcaster, James Wolf, who received
death threats in the 1990s from the Klu Klux Klan when he wanted to
build a radio tower to broadcast programming targeted at the local
African-American community.37'
The effects of the minority undersupply theory are relevant to the
antitrust analysis for several reasons. The fact that a distinct group is a
numerical minority creates incentives to provide programming
targeted to it only when the number of outlets increases to make serv-
ing the minority more profitable than serving another segment of the
majority, or when the minority grows in size to shift that incentive
point. This means that programming for the majority will be provided
first, minority programming will come later, and there will be less of
it. Thus, in the United States, English programming will come first,
and minority languages may follow as the minority grows or new out-
lets are created.
Joel Waldfogel examined data for 246 large United States radio
markets in 1997, including nearly 6000 radio stations.3 72 Waldfogel
compared listening to Spanish stations (which he defined as "His-
panic-targeted"), "black-targeted stations," and "white-targeted sta-
tions" to examine the effects of an increase of market size on product
variety. 373 Waldfogel found that "[m] any markets have few minorities
and few minority-targeted stations (or none at all).,,a74 However, Wald-
fogel found that "[n]o market is without substantial white-targeted
programming. Across 246 markets, the minimum number of white-
targeted stations is 7."375 In contrast, the average number of "black
targeted stations" in his research markets was 1.9, or 7.8%, of stations,
while an average of 1.1, or 4.4%, of stations were Spanish-language. 376
371. Id. at 50-51.
372. Joel Waldfogel, Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benefits Whom in
Differentiated Product Markets 1, 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7391, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7391 (last visited Aug. 21, 2005).
373. Waldfogel defined "black-targeted stations" as the formats labeled: Black, Black/
Adult Contemporary, Black/Gospel, Black/Oldies, Black/Talk, Gospel, and Ethnic. Afri-
can-Americans made up the majority of listeners to each of these formats in the research
markets Waldfogel studied. Over 50% of the African-American listening time in those mar-
kets was devoted to the Black and Black/Adult Contemporary formats, while only 2.5% on
non-black listening was attributed to those formats Id. at 17. He termed "Hispanic-
targeted" as Spanish-language stations, which attracted 45.7% of Hispanic listening in the
research markets. Id. at 13, 18. The remainder were classified by Waldfogel as white-
targeted. Id.
374. Id. at 22.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 13.
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Waldfogel examined the "preference externality" effect, whereby
increases in the size of the racial/ethnic group boosted the amount of
radio programming targeted toward that group.3 77 He found that aug-
mentation of the African-American or Latino populations raised the
number of stations airing formats targeting those groups, which in-
creased the amount time they listened to the radio. 378
As minority-oriented formats were increasingly offered in the
markets Waldfogel studied, African-Americans, and Hispanics
switched from white-targeted programming.379 He found that "[i]n
markets with few or no minority-targeted stations, minorities listen to
other (white-targeted) programming. From small levels, increases in
minority populations bring forth the first few minority-targeted sta-
tions, allowing substantial "'defection' of minorities from white-
targeted stations."380
African-Americans switched from white-targeted formats to black-
targeted formats at a higher rate than Hispanics switched from pre-
sumably English white-targeted formats to Spanish formats in the mar-
kets Waldfogel studied.38 1 He found that "two thirds of black listeners
choose white-targeted stations in markets with one black-targeted sta-
tion, and only a third of black listeners choose white-targeted stations
in markets with four or more black-targeted stations."38 2 For Hispan-
ics, "Three quarters of Hispanic listeners choose white-targeted sta-
tions in markets with one Hispanic station, and half of Hispanic
listeners choose white-targeted stations in markets with four or more
Hispanic-targeted options."38 3
Waldfogel's research shows that although Spanish-language sta-
tions attract many Hispanic listeners, Hispanics are less likely to switch
to Spanish-language stations from white-targeted English-language sta-
tions, than African-Americans are disposed to switch from white-
targeted English-stations to black-targeted English-stations. This find-
ing may reflect language, music, or other programming preferences,
or continued listening by Hispanics to stations in both languages. It
also emphasizes the need to examine the substitutability of English
radio for Spanish radio, even in markets with few Spanish stations.
377. Id. at 26.
378. Id. at 24-27.
379. Id. at 22.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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The long standing practice of paying less for minority radio audi-
ences and formats may also influence market participation. Lower
prices will attract fewer providers to the market since the profits are
lower. This fuels the cycle of a small market with a small number of
participants. In his study on "Audience Valuation and Minority Me-
dia," Philip Napoli concluded that:
the lower valuations that advertisers place on minority audiences
feed into an economic process that works against minority-targeted
content being able to compete and remain viable in both the audi-
ence and content markets. The end result is lower levels of availa-
bility of minority-targeted content.38 4
Napoli's findings suggests that the advertising industry's pricing prac-
tices toward stations that serve minorities are a factor in market partic-
ipation, which in turn affects market concentration for antitrust
analysis.
Arbitron reported that as of 2004, 750 radio stations broadcast in
Spanish-language formats in the United States, with 678 having large
enough audiences in markets Arbitron measures to be included in the
company's ratings. 3 5 The 750 Spanish-language stations constitute
0.6% of the 10,922 commercial AM and FM radio stations licensed by
the FCC. 386 Although the United States Hispanic community is large
and growing, it is a minority in many United States communities. Na-
poli commented, "Minority-targeted media content suffers from not
only the potentially lower valuations of minority audiences but also
from the fact that, by definition, it appeals to a small audience." 38 7
Understanding this history is critical to understanding the struc-
ture of radio, including Spanish-language programming. 388 These dy-
namics delay programming for minority audiences and result in
commensurately fewer broadcasters serving linguistic, racial, and eth-
nic minorities. In defining a market and examining concentration, an-
titrust analysis should consider the likelihood that others will offer
services to a minority group, as well as the forces that created the cur-
rent market.
384. Napoli, supra note 5, at 181.
385. ARBITRON, supra note 119 at 2-3.
386. See FCC Radio Broadcast Totals, supra note 4.
387. Napoli, supra note 5, at 181.
388. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962)) (only a further examination of
the particular market-its structure, history and probable future-can provide the appro-
priate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger).
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Reza Dibadj commented that narrow market definitions, com-
bined with other factors, "can have perverse consequences. ' 39 He ob-
served that "it would tend to target smaller companies in narrow
markets who wish to merge or collaborate, while at the same time ig-
noring the anticompetitive potential of larger companies who operate
in broader markets not amenable to an analysis of elasticities. 39 °
This imbalance is exacerbated when companies associated with
the larger market enter into the smaller market. Such companies can
enter with the benefits of the greater economies of scale permitted in
the larger market and use those efficiencies in the smaller market.
This increases their power to compete in the smaller market. This pro-
cess further entrenches the advantages of companies who have a sig-
nificant base in the larger market.
The small number of broadcasters offering Spanish program-
ming is related to the size of the Hispanic and Spanish-speaking popu-
lation in a geographic area. It may also be influenced by the smaller
rate at which Hispanics switch from English-language to Spanish-lan-
guage programming, compared to the rate at which African-Ameri-
cans switch to programming targeted at their community. The
availability of other formats, such as Spanglish, Tejano, Hurban, and
Reggaeton might further influence listening and advertising behavior
as choice increases. These and other factors regarding industry struc-
ture and market participation are relevant to whether any merger of a
broadcaster offering Spanish programming will have anti-competitive
effects.
In the Univision/HBC merger, the DOJ focused on apparent
market concentration in the small "Spanish market" they defined.
However, the participants in that alleged market are not insulated
from competitive forces outside the market. Even with continuing en-
try of English broadcasters into Spanish formats, the number of prov-
iders in Spanish remains small, in part because the audience they
serve is a minority. An analysis of these factors reveals a lack of market
power on the part of Spanish broadcasters. This result questions
whether the antitrust market has been properly defined.
Conclusion
An analysis of each of the seven factors for defining the contours
of a market articulated by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe raises
389. Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. CoLo. L. REv. 745, 828-29 (2004).
390. Id. at 829.
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questions about whether Spanish-language radio is a distinct sub-
market and suggests areas for further study. The United States His-
panic population, including the Spanish-dominant, use media
extensively in both English and Spanish. The practice of crossing be-
tween Spanish, English, and bilingual stations indicates that many lis-
teners view them as existing within one market, raising the question of
whether English media is an appropriate substitute for advertisers.
Along with evidence that marketers and broadcasters recognize the
need to use a mix of languages to attract Hispanic audiences, there is
not a unified "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a
separate economic entity. ' 139 With the increasing number of bilingual
stations, the playlist of Spanish stations is becoming less unique, indi-
cating the "product" is less distinctive and lacking "peculiar character-
istics and uses" under the Brown Shoe test.39 2 More research is needed
to identify the extent of overlap between listeners to Spanish, Span-
glish, and English stations to identify whether they have "distinct cus-
tomers" as required by Brown Shoe.393 However, data on Hispanics' use
of media in both languages, as well as evidence of non-Hispanic listen-
ers who also enjoy Spanish music, indicates that Spanish, English, and
bilingual broadcasters share many customers.
To the extent that Spanish and English radio have "distinct
prices," another Brown Shoe submarket factor, it should be recognized
that such prices may be a product of the advertising industry underval-
uing minority consumers and stations whose audience is more than
50% minority. 394 Thus, lower prices do not establish Spanish as a sepa-
rate market. The pricing policies toward stations that serve minorities
indicate the interconnection between Spanish stations and others in
the market. For all radio broadcasters, additional studies should be
done on sensitivity to price changes, examining the effect of multiple
ownership and consolidation on advertising prices. 39 5
Spanish stations do not have "unique production facilities," an-
other Brown Shoe market definition factor. The most valuable "produc-
tion facility" is the FCC license to broadcast. Spanish and English
broadcasts are found by turning the same radio dial, which picks up
signals from the radio spectrum allocated for broadcasting. The physi-
391. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 at 325; discussion supra Part III.
392. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 at 325.
393. Id.
394. See Napoli, supra note 5, at 177.
395. Id.
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cal facilities are identical, regardless of the language of the content
aired.
While some companies may broadcast only in Spanish, many in-
cluding Univision, Entravision, Bustos Media, and Border Media Part-
ners also broadcast in other languages indicating they are not solely
Spanish-language "specialized vendors" under the Brown Shoe test.3 9 6
The entrance of predominantly English-language broadcasters into
Spanish also undermines the theory of "specialized vendors."
This analysis of the Brown Shoe factors raises questions about
whether the United States radio market is properly defined by the lan-
guage of a radio station's programming. In light of the concerns ar-
ticulated in this Article, I propose that the DOJ should consider the
relevant market for mergers, such as that between Univision and
HBC, to be the whole radio market in the overlapping geographical
areas in which the parties compete. Defining the radio market as "all
stations" within the relevant geographic area will level the competitive
playing field for mergers and acquisitions between English, Spanish,
bilingual, and other content providers.
The market definition must also take into account the probability
of English-language stations changing to Spanish-language formats. A
finding that a merger will have anticompetitive effects requires a show-
ing that the merger will substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. 397 Monopoly is characterized by market power, in-
cluding the ability to control prices or exclude competitors. 398 The
DOJ has not established that Univision of other Spanish broadcasters
have the power to control prices or exclude competitors. By failing to
analyze the effect of the entry of other broadcasters into Spanish for-
mats, the DOJ has not thoroughly examined whether the merger is
likely to lessen competition. Competitor entry from English-language
formats is not only feasible but likely.399
With the entrance of Clear Channel, Infinity, and ABC Radio
Network into Spanish-language radio formats, the number of Spanish-
language competitors has expanded. More may enter the market if
they believe that the Spanish-speaking listeners, and English speakers
who enjoy Spanish music, are underserved. Other English broadcast-
ers, particularly highly consolidated companies, are also potential
competitors: they own the assets of a radio station, have an FCC li-
396. Id.
397. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
398. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956).
399. See discussion supra Part IV.
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cense, could buy programming from a syndicator, and quickly convert
their station to Spanish. Competition from new media such as satellite
radio and podcasting may accelerate these trends as broadcasters re-
spond to more diverse outlets.400
Market entry and format switching are dynamic processes that are
not adequately factored into the static HHI model. The HHI should
be calculated to take into account the possibility of committed and
uncommitted entrants. The potential impact of such competitors, es-
pecially those which currently program in Spanish in other markets,
must be considered in determining whether markets are unduly
concentrated.
The market definition should also account for audience overlap
with stations in other languages or bilingual formats. To the extent
that a Spanish station has a substantial overlap between its audience
and the audience of a bilingual or English station, those common lis-
teners indicate that the other stations may be a potential substitute for
advertisers and listeners. This overlap could be accounted for in the
HHI analysis by discounting the audience share to the extent of the
overlap with other formats.
More detailed analysis should be done on the extent of such audi-
ence overlap and how it shifts in response to new format offered in
the market. Waldfogel's analysis shows that new Spanish stations will
draw listeners away from English, but not to as large an extent as new
black-targeted stations draw listeners away from white-targeted for-
mats.40  Waldfogel's 1997 database did not include any bilingual for-
mats such as Tejano, Spanglish, or Hurban.40 2 It will be important to
analyze the effect of bilingual stations on drawing listeners from En-
glish, as well as Spanish stations.
The DOJ's Spanish-language market definition is based on the
theory that it must guard against over-concentration in the Spanish-
language broadcast market to protect the advertisers who target Span-
400. Subscription-based satellite radio operator XM Radio offers four Spanish stations,
while Sirius offers six, three of them music-based. See XM Radio-Latin, http://www.xm
radio.com/programming/neighborhood.jsp?hood=latin (last visited Aug. 1, 2005); Sirius
Satellite Radio-En Espafol, http://www.sirius.com/enespanol (last visited Aug, 1, 2005).
Podcasting allows producers of audio content to make their programming available over
the internet to listeners with personal audio devices such as iPods. The number of podcasts
is growing daily. See Matthew Fordahl, Podcasting Brings Radio Production to the Masses, Choice
to Listeners, TECH. REV., Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://cache.technologyreview.com/arti-
cles/05/02/ap/ap-2020705.asp?p=1.
401. Waldfogel, supra note 372, at 22.
402. Id. at 39.
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ish-speakers and those who listen to Spanish radio from price in-
creases. The data provided by the Hispanic Opinion Tracker,
Arbitron, and other sources indicate that there is more cross-over be-
tween languages and formats for Hispanic and Spanish-speaking lis-
teners than the DOJ assumed.40 3 Accordingly, the products may have
greater interchangeability than the DOJ posited. Moreover, the lack of
significant barriers to entry for predominantly English broadcasters,
and their ability to cross into Spanish formats and reap audiences,
advertisers, and profits across languages indicates that the markets are
integrated, not rigidly separated.
The issue of how to ensure competition in a variety of broadcast
languages has domestic and international implications as media seek
to serve people speaking a plethora of languages. As the United States
becomes more diverse, the current market definition raises questions
about how companies serving those who enjoy Spanish-language pro-
gramming, and other language minorities, will be treated as the mar-
kets they serve grow. The United States Hispanic population is larger
than Canada's entire population.40 4 With higher growth rates than the
United States population as a whole, the number of Hispanics and
Spanish-speakers will likely increase.40 5 The opportunities to serve this
market should grow accordingly and not be artificially restricted by ill-
drawn antitrust markets.
The ideals of promoting competition and protecting consumers
from dominance will be better served by recognizing the extent to
which Spanish, English, and other hybrid-language radio formats
compete within the same market. Competition will be enhanced and
the public will be better served by eliminating disincentives to broad-
cast in Spanish or other minority languages. This recognition is essen-
tial not just for antitrust purposes, but because the "marketplace of
ideas" is a cornerstone of our democracy. 40 6 Regulations on that mar-
ketplace should not deter broadcasts in minority languages, but
should encourage multilingual service and competition.
403. See discussion supra Part III.
404. See Statistics Canada, Population by year, by province and territory, http://www40.
statcan.ca/101/cst0l/demo02.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (providing Canadian popula-
tion statistics).
405. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 6.
406. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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